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WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY:  
WHY THE SECOND SENTENCE OF THE 
OHIO MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
VIOLATES EQUAL PROTECTION 
On November 2, 2004, Issue 1, known as the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment, passed with 62% of the popular vote.1 The Amendment 
reads: 
Only a union between one man and one woman may be a 
marriage valid in or recognized by this state and its political 
subdivisions. This state and its political subdivisions shall not 
create or recognize a legal status for relationships of 
unmarried individuals that intends to approximate the design, 
qualities, significance or effect of marriage.2 
In the wake of Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,3 which 
legalized same-sex marriage in Massachusetts, and Baker v. State,4 
which mandated civil unions in Vermont, same-sex marriage 
opponents argued that the Ohio Marriage Amendment was necessary 
to prevent the march of same-sex marriage and civil unions into the 
Midwest. The passage of the Ohio Marriage Amendment achieved 
this goal. Unless the Amendment is either repealed or declared 
unconstitutional, couples in same-sex marriages and civil unions 
cannot receive legal recognition in Ohio.5 
                                                                                                                 
1 OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, STATE ISSUE 1: NOVEMBER 2, 2004 OFFICIAL RESULTS, 
http://www.sos.state.oh.us/SOS/elections/electResultsMain/2004ElectionsResults/04-
1102Issue1.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2011). 
2 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11.  
3 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).  
4 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).  
5 To date, no state that has adopted a constitutional marriage amendment has decided to 
repeal it. However, a district court recently held that California’s marriage amendment violated 
both the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Perry v. 
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (permanently enjoining the 
enforcement of Proposition 8, California’s marriage amendment). The Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has stayed the district court’s opinion pending appeal. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 
No. 10-16696, 2010 WL 3212786 (9th Cir. Aug. 16, 2010). 
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Despite the certainty the Amendment brought to same-sex 
marriages and civil unions, the fate of Ohio’s domestic partnership 
registries and benefits programs is in legal limbo. David R. Langdon 
is the author of the Ohio Marriage Amendment and serves as counsel 
to Citizens for Community Values (“CCV”),6 the main sponsors of 
the Amendment.7 David R. Langdon has also represented the 
plaintiffs in all three cases challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s 
domestic partnership programs. In Brinkman v. Miami University,8 
former Ohio State Representative Tom Brinkman, a close associate of 
CCV President Phil Burress, claimed that Miami University’s same-
sex domestic partnership benefits policy violated the second sentence 
of the Ohio Marriage Amendment.9 In City of Cleveland Heights ex 
rel. Hicks v. City of Cleveland Heights,10 former Cleveland Heights 
Councilman Jimmie Hicks challenged the constitutionality of 
Cleveland Heights’ domestic partner registry under the Ohio Home 
Rule Amendment. In Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. 
City of Cleveland,11 Langdon argued that Ohio’s Home Rule 
Amendment and the second sentence of the Marriage Amendment 
prohibited the City of Cleveland from maintaining its domestic 
                                                                                                                 
6  See Press Release, Citizens for Cmty. Values, City of Cleveland Asked to Cease and 
Desist with Domestic Partnership Registry (May 7, 2009), available at http://www.ccv.org/2009 
/05/07/city-of-cleveland-asked-to-cease-and-desist-with-domestic-partnership-registry/ (noting 
that Langdon was the Ohio Marriage Amendment’s primary author); see also Anthony 
Glassman, Judge Calls Brinkman the True Villain, Again, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRON. (Aug. 24, 
2007), http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories07/aug/0824074.htm (stating that David R. 
Langdon is counsel to both CCV and Ohio State Rep. Thomas Brinkman and had advised both 
men that they could falsify election petitions); Sarah Sturmon & Sharon Moloney, Family PAC 
Is Stressing Moral Issues, CINCINNATI POST, Oct. 14, 1997, at 8A (stating that David R. 
Langdon is counsel to CCV). 
7  See Brief for Citizens for Community Values as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, State 
v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007) (No. 2006-0151) (detailing CCV’s sponsorship of 
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment); see also C. Susie Lorden, The Law of Unintended 
Consequences: The Far-Reaching Effects of Same-Sex Marriage Ban Amendments, 25 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 211, 222–23 (2006) (chronicling CCV’s sponsorship of the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment and arguing that CCV intended to attack gays and lesbians through the 
Amendment). 
8 No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007). 
9 Id. at *1. Prior to suing Miami University over its same-sex domestic partnership 
program, former State Representative Brinkman also served as an intervening defendant in 
Equality Foundation of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th 
Cir. 1997) (holding that a Cincinnati charter amendment prohibiting gays, lesbians, and 
bisexuals from receiving antidiscrimination protection did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). Equal Rights, Not Special Rights (“ERNSR”) was 
another intervening defendant in this case. Id. at 289. Phil Burress, the head of CCV, which 
sponsored Ohio’s Marriage Amendment, is also the head of ERNSR. See Glassman, supra note 
6 (stating that Burress is the leader of both ERNSR and CCV).  
10 832 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
11 No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010).  
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partner registry. Although the courts in all three of these cases held in 
favor of the defendants,12 this area of Ohio law is not yet settled.13 
This Note asserts that the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment is a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Instead of arguing that Ohio’s domestic 
partnership registries and benefits programs are compatible with the 
Ohio Marriage Amendment, which may very well be the case,14 this 
Note argues that the second sentence of the Marriage Amendment is a 
sophisticated form of discrimination specifically targeting gays and 
lesbians, and not, as the Amendment’s text states, “unmarried 
individuals.”  
This Note proceeds as follows: Part I lays out the litigation 
inspired by the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Part II explains the 
differences between civil unions and domestic partnership programs 
across the country and in Ohio. Part III provides a brief survey of 
state marriage amendments. Part IV discusses United States Supreme 
Court precedent concerning LGBT rights and equal protection 
analysis in cases with facially neutral laws. In the first half of this 
section, this Note looks at the impact of Romer v. Evans15 and 
Lawrence v. Texas,16 two landmark cases that address LGBT legal 
issues. The second half of this section discusses Washington v. 
Davis,17 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing 
                                                                                                                 
12 See Cleveland Taxpayers, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981, at *16, 24 (holding that 
Cleveland’s domestic partner registry ordinance did not violate the Ohio Marriage Amendment); 
Brinkman, 2007 WL 2410390, at *13 (rejecting a challenge to Miami University’s policy of 
providing employee health benefits for same-sex partners because the party bringing the 
challenge lacked standing); Hicks, 832 N.E.2d at 1277–78 (upholding a domestic partner 
registry ordinance because it was within the municipality’s home rule powers to enact the 
ordinance). 
13 See infra Part I (discussing case law arising from the enactment of the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment). 
14 See Cleveland Taxpayers, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981, at *16 (“[W]e find that 
Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry ordinance does not violate [Ohio’s] Marriage 
Amendment.” (citation omitted)); see also Mark Strasser, State Marriage Amendments and 
Overreaching: On Plain Meaning, Good Public Policy, and Constitutional Limitations, 25 LAW 
& INEQ. 59, 84 (2007) (“Just as [Ohio’s Marriage Amendment] does not preclude the state from 
treating an unmarried person like a spouse in any respect, the amendment does not preclude the 
state from treating an unmarried person like a spouse in any particular respect, e.g., from 
enjoying benefits traditionally associated with marriage.”). 
15 517 U.S. 620, 635–36 (1996) (holding that Colorado’s Amendment 2, which prohibited 
gays and lesbians from receiving the protection of existing antidiscrimination laws or from 
creating new antidiscrimination laws, violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
16 539 U.S. 558, 578–79 (2003) (holding that Texas’s anti-same-sex-sodomy law violated 
a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, and overruling 
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), which upheld Georgia’s anti-sodomy law). 
17 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (holding that a police recruitment test that had a 
discriminatory impact against blacks was nevertheless constitutional because the test was not 
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Development Corp.,18 and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,19 three 
cases where the Supreme Court analyzed facially neutral laws that 
had a disproportionate impact upon either racial minorities or women. 
In these cases, the Supreme Court held that a facially neutral law 
would be unconstitutional only if 1) the law had a disproportionate 
impact on an unnamed group and 2) the law was always intended to 
harm that unnamed group. Although the Supreme Court upheld the 
challenged laws in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney, these cases 
laid the groundwork for a finding that the second sentence of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment is unconstitutional. 
Part V argues that the removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership 
registries and benefits programs would have a disparate impact on 
gays and lesbians. This section establishes that same-sex couples 
make up the majority of the couples in Ohio’s domestic partnership 
registries and public health benefits programs.  
Part VI argues that Ohio’s Marriage Amendment was always 
intended to disproportionately impact same-sex couples, and not just 
unmarried individuals. This conclusion is supported under three 
different theories. First, Section A argues that attacks against 
domestic partnership programs, even those that are gender-neutral, 
inherently target gays and lesbians. To accomplish this objective, this 
Note analyzes the history of domestic partnership programs in the 
United States and Ohio, and determines that the primary purpose of 
these programs is to benefit gays and lesbians who are prohibited 
from marrying. Therefore, campaigns against domestic partnership 
programs are necessarily campaigns against these programs’ intended 
beneficiaries: same-sex couples.  
Second, Section B of Part VI contends that CCV and the Ohio 
Campaign to Protect Marriage (“OCPM”), a political action 
committee controlled by CCV, misled Ohio voters about the 
Amendment’s scope and abused Ohio’s ballot initiative process. 
Section B is comprised of three subsections. The first subsection 
chronicles the vulnerabilities and criticisms of the ballot initiative 
process, namely that  
                                                                                                                 
 
adopted with a discriminatory intent).  
18 429 U.S. 252, 270–71 (1977) (holding that a village did not unconstitutionally 
discriminate against minorities when it refused to rezone a parcel of land necessary for the 
development of a mostly minority housing project).  
19 442 U.S. 256, 279–81 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts statute giving absolute 
preference to veterans in civil service jobs did not discriminate against women or violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause).  
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1) the Founding Fathers disapproved of direct democracy 
because it facilitated a tyranny of the majority;  
2) ballot initiatives, particularly when they concern the rights 
of minorities, are often created by special interest groups who 
wish to circumvent the checks and balances of representative 
democracy; and  
3) ballot initiative proponents, who are not held politically 
accountable through elections, often try to confuse and 
manipulate voters into passing otherwise obtuse and 
ambiguous legislation.  
The second subsection establishes that CCV bears animus towards 
gays and lesbians and openly advocates for state-sponsored 
discrimination against Ohio’s LGBT community. Although CCV 
claims it is not “against” same-sex couples, this Note shows that CCV 
advocated the same opinions against gays and lesbians as Colorado 
for Family Values (“CFV”), the sponsors of Colorado’s animus-
driven Amendment 2.  
The third subsection uses CCV’s own advertisements and 
statements to show that it confused and manipulated the public over 
Issue 1’s impact. Specifically, this Note demonstrates that CCV 
always intended to attack Ohio’s domestic partnership programs with 
the Marriage Amendment, but that CCV never divulged this intent in 
its advertisements. Moreover, CCV’s advertisements either confused 
voters about the fate of Ohio’s domestic partnership programs, or 
explicitly asserted that Issue 1 would not affect these institutions. 
Finally, Section C of Part VI argues that if Ohio’s public domestic 
partnership programs are ever declared unconstitutional, then the 
effects of this decision would be so broad and harmful to Ohio’s 
LGBT community that the second sentence of the Marriage 
Amendment would automatically betray an intentional, and 
unconstitutional, antigay animus. If Ohio’s domestic partnership 
programs are invalidated under the second sentence of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment, then all of Ohio’s public institutions would be 
prohibited from recognizing same-sex couples, even down to the 
municipal level. This end result would have significant consequences 
for same-sex couples, forcing the State to treat them as legal pariahs. 
This total prohibition of same-sex-couple recognition would prove 
that the Ohio Marriage Amendment contains antigay animus because 
1) under Lawrence, gays and lesbians have a Fourteenth Amendment 
right to form same-sex couples, 2) same-sex couples can never leave 
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the “unmarried class” under Ohio law, and 3) under Romer, such 
broad and far reaching effects against gays and lesbians throughout 
the entire State of Ohio cannot be a legitimate governmental interest. 
Part VII concludes that because the invalidation of Ohio’s 
domestic partnership programs would disproportionately impact 
same-sex couples, and because the purpose of the second sentence of 
the Ohio Marriage Amendment is to harm Ohio’s LGBT community, 
the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment must violate 
the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I. LITIGATION RESULTING FROM THE OHIO MARRIAGE AMENDMENT 
Shortly after Ohio adopted its Marriage Amendment in 2004, the 
legality of Ohio’s domestic violence statute,20 domestic partnership 
benefits programs,21 and domestic partnership registries were thrown 
into doubt.22 In 2005, a trial court in State v. Burk23 declared that 
Ohio’s domestic violence law, which grants domestic violence 
protection to “a person living as a spouse,”24 violated the second 
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment.25 Although this decision 
was later reversed at the appellate level,26 it opened the floodgates for 
similar litigation and caused a split amongst Ohio’s appellate courts.27  
                                                                                                                 
20 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25 (West 2010). Compare State v. Ward, 849 N.E.2d 
1076, 1082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006) (finding that a provision in Ohio’s domestic violence statute 
that extended protection to “a person living as a spouse” violated Ohio’s Marriage Amendment), 
rev’d sub nom. In re Ohio Domestic-Violence Statute Cases, 872 N.E.2d 1212, 1212–13 (Ohio 
2007) (reversing all pending appeals in conflict with State v. Carswell, 817 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 
2007), which held that Ohio’s domestic violence statute did not violate Ohio’s Marriage 
Amendment), with State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254, 1258 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (holding that 
Ohio’s domestic violence statute did not violate Ohio’s Marriage Amendment). 
21 See Brinkman v. Miami Univ., No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. 
Aug. 27, 2007) (determining whether Miami University, a public institution, had a same-sex 
domestic partner benefits program that violated the Ohio Marriage Amendment). 
22 See Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland, No. 94327, 2010 
Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (determining whether Cleveland’s 
domestic partnership registry violated Ohio’s Marriage and Home Rule Amendments); City of 
Cleveland Heights ex rel Hicks v. City of Cleveland Heights, 832 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 
2007) (determining whether the City of Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry 
violated the Ohio Home Rule Amendment).  
23 No. CR 462510, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d 843 
N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
24 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.25(F)(1)(a)(i) (West 2010). 
25 Burk, 2005 WL 786212, at *8 (holding that the Ohio domestic violence statute violated 
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment “insofar as it recognizes as a ‘family or household member’ a 
person who is not married to the offender but is ‘living as a spouse’”). 
26 State v. Burk, 843 N.E.2d 1254, 1256–59 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005) (upholding the 
constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic violence statute). 
27 See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Voies, No. 86317, 2006 WL 440341, at *1 (Ohio Ct. 
App. Feb. 23, 2006) (overturning lower court’s judgment that the Ohio domestic violence 
statute violated the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment); State v. Dixon, No. 
 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
2011] WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY 1321 
In July 2007, in State v. Carswell,28 the Supreme Court of Ohio 
resolved the split and held that Ohio’s domestic violence statute did 
not violate the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment.29 
In coming to its conclusion, the Court announced that “the second 
sentence of the amendment means the state cannot create or recognize 
a legal status for unmarried persons that bears all of the attributes of 
marriage—a marriage substitute.”30 Despite the boldness of this 
declaration, which appears to protect Ohio’s domestic partnership 
programs and limit the scope of the Amendment’s second sentence 
only to “marriage substitutes,” there is cause for concern among 
Ohio’s gay-rights activists.  
First, in Carswell, the Court indicated in a footnote that Ohio’s 
domestic partnership benefits programs might violate the Marriage 
Amendment.31 Citing Ohio Revised Code Section 3101.01(C)(3), the 
Court noted, “regarding benefits for government 
employees . . . benefits for marriage partners should not be conferred 
upon individuals cohabiting out of wedlock, whatever their gender.”32  
Second, the Supreme Court of Ohio has the power to find that 
Ohio’s domestic partnership programs violate the Ohio 
Constitution.33 To that end, other state supreme courts have been 
                                                                                                                 
 
2005 CR 0091, 2005 WL 1940110, at *4 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. Apr. 26, 2005) (holding that Ohio’s 
domestic violence statute violated the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment); see 
also Lorden, supra note 7, at 233–36 (listing the challenges to Ohio’s domestic violence 
statute). 
28 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007). 
29 Id. at 554. 
30 Id. at 551. 
31 See id. at 551 n.1 (describing the intent of the Ohio Marriage Amendment). 
32 Id. at 551–52 n.1. However, this argument can be countered by carefully reading Ohio 
Revised Code Section 3101.01(C)(3)(a) and (b), which states: 
Nothing in division (C)(3) of this section shall be construed to do either of the 
following: 
(a) Prohibit the extension of specific benefits otherwise enjoyed by all persons, 
married or unmarried, to nonmarital relationships between persons of the same sex or 
different sexes, including the extension of benefits conferred by any statute that is 
not expressly limited to married persons, which includes but is not limited to benefits 
available under Chapter 4117[] of the Revised Code; 
(b) Affect the validity of private agreements that are otherwise valid under the 
laws of this state. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C)(3)(a)–(b) (West 2010). There is no Ohio law stating that 
employer-provided health insurance is a right or benefit limited only to married couples. 
33 See Carswell, 871 N.E.2d at 549-50 (noting that although statutes are presumed to be 
constitutional, the Ohio Supreme Court has the authority to ultimately declare a statute 
unconstitutional). 
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ruling on the constitutionality of domestic partnership programs under 
their own state constitutions. For example, in 2008, the Supreme 
Court of Michigan in National Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of 
Michigan34 broadly interpreted the Michigan Marriage Amendment, 
which is very similar to the Ohio Marriage Amendment and was 
likewise adopted via ballot initiative in 2004.35 The Supreme Court of 
Michigan held that the state could not grant health insurance benefits 
to the same-sex partners of gay employees.36 Additionally, Wisconsin 
courts are currently hearing a challenge to the state’s domestic 
partnership registry. Wisconsin Family Action, the proponents of the 
Wisconsin Marriage Amendment and plaintiffs to the suit, claim that 
the registry violates the second sentence of the Wisconsin Marriage 
Amendment.37 Further, Wisconsin Governor Scott Walker has stated 
that he believes the domestic partnership registry is unconstitutional; 
on May 13, 2011 he filed a motion to stop the state’s defense of its 
registry.38 
Finally, as evidenced by the litigation in Brinkman v. Miami 
University,39 City of Cleveland Heights ex rel. Hicks v. City of 
Cleveland Heights,40 and Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution 
v. City of Cleveland,41 Carswell has not stopped CCV, the main 
sponsors of the Ohio Marriage Amendment,42 and David R. 
Langdon—author of the Amendment and counsel to CCV43—from 
                                                                                                                 
34 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008). 
35 Id. at 529. Compare OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (“This state and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals that intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage.”), with MICH. CONST. art I, § 25 (“[T]he union of one man and one woman in 
marriage shall be the only agreement recognized as a marriage or similar union for any 
purpose.”). 
36 Nat’l Pride at Work, 748 N.W.2d at 543. However, public employers in Michigan have 
found a way around the Michigan Supreme Court’s ruling by augmenting their benefits policies. 
Instead of granting health benefits based upon the existence of a relationship between 
employees and their partners, certain public employers in Michigan now offer health benefits to 
any person who has resided with a public employee for at least one year. See Associated Press, 
Michigan Commission OKs Domestic-Partner Benefits, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Jan. 27, 
2011, http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9L0NEBG0.htm. 
37 See Scott Bauer, Lawsuit Challenges State’s Domestic Partner Registry, LACROSSE 
TRIBUNE, Aug. 19, 2010, http://lacrossetribune.com/news/state-and-regional/wi/article_ 
cbb1018a-ab0b-11df-8d15-001cc4c002e0.html (discussing the lawsuit challenging Wisconsin’s 
domestic partner registry).  
38  See Patrick Marley, Walker Seeks to Stop Defense of State’s Domestic Partner Registry, 
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, May 16, 2011, http://www.jsonline.mobi/news/statepolitics/ 
121956273.html. 
39  No. CA2006-12-313, 2007 WL 2410390 (Ohio Ct. App. Aug. 27, 2007). 
40  832 N.E.2d 1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005). 
41  No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010). 
42 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.  
43 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
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challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic partnership 
registries and benefits programs.  
In Brinkman v. Miami University, former Ohio State 
Representative Tom Brinkman, with Langdon as his attorney, 
challenged the constitutionality of Miami University’s same-sex 
domestic partnership benefits program under the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment.44 The Ohio Court of Appeals for the Twelfth District 
dismissed the case because Brinkman lacked standing;45 the court did 
not rule on the merits of Brinkman’s claim or elaborate on the impact 
of Carswell, which the Supreme Court of Ohio had decided only one 
month prior.46  
In City of Cleveland Heights ex rel. Hicks v. City of Cleveland 
Heights, Langdon again served as plaintiff’s counsel in the first case 
to challenge the constitutionality of an Ohio domestic partnership 
registry.47 The Eighth District Court of Appeals held that Cleveland 
Heights’ registry fell under the protection of the Ohio Home Rule 
Amendment, which grants complete authority to Ohio municipalities 
in matters of local self-governance.48  
Four years later, in Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. 
City of Cleveland, Langdon represented a new plaintiff, alleging that 
Cleveland’s domestic partner registry violated the Ohio Marriage and 
Home Rule Amendments.49 Relying mainly on Hicks, the court 
dispatched with the Home Rule argument.50 Applying Carswell, the 
Eighth District upheld the registry’s constitutionality under the 
second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. 
According to a unanimous Eighth District Court of Appeals, 
Carswell had a simple holding: “any legally established relationship 
bearing less than all the attributes of marriage is constitutional.”51 
Since Cleveland’s domestic partner registry did not confer even the 
basic legal benefits or responsibilities of marriage, such as the right to 
                                                                                                                 
44 2007 WL 2410390 at *1; see also supra note 9 (discussing Brinkman’s relationship 
with CCV founder Phil Burress). 
45 Brinkman, 2007 WL 2410390 at *13–14. 
46 Carswell was decided on July 25, 2007. State v. Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007). 
Brinkman was decided on August 27, 2007. Brinkman, 2007 WL 2410390. 
47 832 N.E.2d at 1275–77. Although the Marriage Amendment had already been adopted 
by the time the Eighth District Court of Appeals ruled on Hicks, Langdon’s sole argument in 
Hicks was that Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry violated the Home Rule 
Amendment of the Ohio Constitution. Id. at 1277. 
48 Id. at 1278–79. 
49 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 at *4. 
50 Id. at *18 (“Cleveland’s domestic partner registry ordinance is nearly identical to the 
domestic partner registry previously upheld by this court in Hicks. . . . Therefore, like Hicks, we 
find that Cleveland’s domestic partner registry is within Cleveland’s home rule authority.”). 
51 Id. at *8 (emphasis added). 
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inherit intestate or the procedural requirements of divorce,52 the 
registry was not only constitutional, but “in essence, simply a 
label.”53 In reaching this determination, the Eighth District did not 
limit its analysis solely to the legal aspects of marriage. According to 
the court, its holding also relied on the fact that “the term ‘domestic 
partner’ completely lacks the social and emotive resonance of 
‘husband’ and ‘wife.’ Domestic partnerships are not given the same 
respect by society as a married couple, and they share none of 
marriage’s history and traditions.”54 Thus, without the legal or 
societal importance of marriage, the court upheld the constitutionality 
of Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry. 
Although the future of Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and 
benefits programs remain uncertain, for the moment they may 
continue to exist. 
II. WHAT’S THE DIFFERENCE?: CIVIL UNIONS V. DOMESTIC 
PARTNERSHIPS V. OHIO’S DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 
There are three kinds of state-created marriage-alternatives: civil 
unions, domestic partnerships, and beneficiary programs.  
Civil unions are commonly considered “marriage substitutes”55 
and have served as the predecessors to same-sex marriage in three 
states: Vermont, Connecticut, and New Hampshire.56 Only two states 
currently issue civil union certificates: New Jersey and Illinois.57 
Hawaii and Delaware recently passed civil union legislation and will 
                                                                                                                 
52 Id. at *9–12. 
53 Id. at *12. 
54 Id. at *11. 
55 See Erin Cleary, Note, New Jersey Domestic Partnership Act in the Aftermath of Lewis 
v. Harris: Should New Jersey Expand the Act to Include All Unmarried Cohabitants?, 60 
RUTGERS L. REV. 519, 523 (2008) (“Civil unions are designed to be virtually identical to 
traditional marriages between a man and a woman, but are limited in scope to same-sex 
couples.”). 
56 Vermont became the first state to adopt civil unions in 2000, and the first state to 
legislatively accept same-sex marriage in 2009. See Abby Goodnough, Rejecting Veto, Vermont 
Backs Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 2009, at A1. In 2005, Connecticut became the first 
state to adopt civil unions without the requirement of a court order. See William Yardley, 
Connecticut Approves Civil Unions for Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 2005, at B5. In 2008, the 
Connecticut Supreme Court in Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 957 A.2d 407 
(2008), declared that the state’s ban on same-sex marriage violated the Connecticut constitution. 
New Hampshire is the only state to legislatively accept both civil unions and same-sex marriage, 
which it respectively accomplished in 2007 and 2009. See Anthony Faiola, N.H. Is Set to 
Approve Same-Sex Civil Unions, WASH. POST, Apr. 26, 2007, at A1; Abby Goodnough, New 
Hampshire Approves Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2009, at A19. 
57 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1–31 (West Supp. 2010); 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. 75/1 (2011); see 
Monique Garcia, Quinn Signs Historic Civil Union Bill Into Law: Same-Sex Couples Will Get 
Many of the Rights as Married Counterparts, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 1, 2011, at 6. 
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start granting civil unions on January 1, 2012.58 With the recent 
exceptions of Hawaii and Illinois, civil unions have traditionally been 
offered only to same-sex couples.59 Couples in civil unions typically 
enjoy all of the state-level benefits of marriage.60 But they are not 
able to receive the federal benefits of marriage,61 guaranteed 
relationship recognition in other jurisdictions,62 or considered legally 
“married” in any state.63  
In contrast with the relative nationwide consistency of civil unions, 
domestic partnerships vary greatly from state to state, both in terms of 
benefits offered and eligibility requirements.64 Washington,65 
                                                                                                                 
58 See B.J. Reyes, Hawaii Now Seventh State to Legalize Civil Unions, HONOLULU STAR 
ADVERTISER, Feb. 23, 2011, http://www.staradvertiser.com/news/breaking/116776119.html; 
Beth Miller, Governor Signs Delaware Civil Unions Bill, USA TODAY, May 12, 2011, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2011-05-12-delaware-civil-unions_n.htm. 
59 In June 2011, Illinois became the first state to offer civil unions to both same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples. See Garcia, supra note 57. Hawaii will start offering civil unions to same-
sex and opposite-sex couples in January 2012. See Reyes, supra note 58. 
60 See Cleary, supra note 55, at 523. 
61 According to the Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006), “the word ‘marriage’ 
means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”  
62 See Defense of Marriage Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (“No State . . . shall be 
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other 
State . . . respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage 
under the laws of such other State . . . or a right or claim arising from such relationship.”). 
63 For example, although same-sex couples may enter into civil unions in New Jersey and 
receive all the benefits of marriage, New Jersey regards “marriage” as a union reserved for 
heterosexual couples. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1–28(f) (West Supp. 2010) (declaring that the 
purpose of civil unions is to provide “same-sex couples with the same rights and benefits as 
heterosexual couples who choose to marry”). 
64 Regardless of how states define “domestic partnerships,” commentators generally 
employ similar definitions. The most common definition states that “[d]omestic partnerships are 
contracts between two parties asserting that their relationship exhibits the core characteristics of 
an intimate association like a marriage.” Ron-Christopher Stamps, Note, Domestic Partnership 
Legislation: Recognizing Non-Traditional Families, 19 S.U. L. REV. 441, 451 (1992). The 
broadest definition of a domestic partnership “would include any two persons who reside 
together and who rely on each other for financial and emotional support . . . [and recognize that] 
a sexual relationship is not a requirement, although it may evidence emotional commitment 
between the partners.” Robert L. Eblin, Note, Domestic Partnership Recognition in the 
Workplace: Equitable Employee Benefits for Gay Couples (and Others), 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 1067, 
1069 n.11 (1990). 
The larger debate among scholars does not concern itself with the technical definition of 
“domestic partnership,” but with the ultimate objective of these institutions. According to Paul 
R. Lynd: 
A domestic partnership may be seen as (1) a permanent relationship that is an 
alternative to marriage and open to any couple, with some or all of the benefits that 
are consequent to a lawful marriage; (2) a temporary alternative to marriage for 
same-sex couples that fills a gap in marriage laws, but which would be superseded 
by lawful marriage if a state ever allows same-sex couples to marry legally; or (3) a 
permanent parallel institution existing only for same-sex couples that is essentially a 
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Oregon,66 and Nevada67 have state-wide domestic partnership 
schemes that are nearly identical to civil unions.68 Of these three 
states, however, only Oregon’s domestic partnership program is 
strictly limited to same-sex couples.69 Other states, such as 
California,70 Maine,71 Wisconsin,72 and Rhode Island,73 have a 
patchwork quilt of eligibility requirements for their domestic 
partnership programs. Further, the rights of domestic partners in these 
programs are not equal to the rights of married couples. Also, the 
rights these programs offer vary greatly from state to state. For 
                                                                                                                 
 
de facto marriage with many or all of the benefits consequent to a lawful marriage, 
but without a marriage license or the designation “marriage” conferred by law. 
Paul R. Lynd, Domestic Partner Benefits Limited to Same-Sex Couples: Sex Discrimination 
Under Title VII, 6 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 561, 570 (2000).  
65 WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.015 (2009) (“The provisions of [this law] shall be liberally 
construed to achieve equal treatment . . . of state registered domestic partners and married 
spouses.”). 
66 OR. REV. STAT. § 106.305(5) (2009) (The Oregon Family Fairness Act extends 
“benefits, protections and responsibilities to committed same-sex partners and their children that 
are comparable to those provided to married individuals and their children by the laws of this 
state”). 
67 NEV. REV. STAT. § 122A.200(1)(b) (2010) (“[D]omestic partners have the same rights, 
protections and benefits, and are subject to the same responsibilities, obligations and duties 
under law . . . as are granted to and imposed upon . . . spouses.”). 
68 Washington’s domestic partnership statute only recently offered rights akin to civil 
unions. In 2007, when Washington first began recognizing domestic partnerships, domestic 
partners in Washington enjoyed far fewer benefits. Act of Apr. 21, 2007, ch. 156, 2007 Wash. 
Legis. Serv. 616. Eventually, Governor Christine Gregoire signed legislation in 2009 expanding 
Washington’s domestic partnerships into de facto civil unions. Act of May 18, 2009, ch. 521, 
2009 Wash. Legis. Serv. 3065. Same-sex marriage opponents then successfully petitioned to 
have this law, popularly nicknamed “Everything but Marriage,” placed on the 2004 state ballot. 
See William Yardley, Washington: Same-Sex Partnership Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6 2009, at 
A21. On Nov. 4, 2009, Washington voters approved Referendum 71, thereby expanding 
Washington’s domestic partnership law. See id. 
69 OR. REV. STAT. § 106.310 (2009). In Washington, domestic partnerships are open to all 
same-sex couples and to opposite-sex couples where at least one partner is age sixty-two or 
older. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.60.030 (West 2009). In Nevada, a couple may enter into a 
domestic partnership regardless of the age or gender of the partners. NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 122A.100 (2010). 
70 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West 2010). In California, domestic partnerships are available 
to all same-sex couples and to opposite-sex couples where at least one person is age sixty-two or 
older. Id. 
71 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2710 (2010). In Maine, all same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples may enter into a domestic partnership regardless of the ages of the partners. Id. 
72 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.001 (West 2010). In Wisconsin, only same-sex couples may 
enter into a domestic partnership. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 770.05 (West 2010). 
73 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 5-33.2-24 (2010) (granting domestic partners the right to make 
funeral arrangements for one another); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4-10 (2010) (granting domestic 
partners the right to receive each others’ bodies from state medical examiners).  
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example, California, Maine, and Wisconsin allow domestic partners 
to inherit intestate,74 but Rhode Island does not.75 
Finally, Hawaii and Colorado offer “beneficiary programs,” which 
are merely “domestic partnerships” operating under a different name. 
Hawaii has a “reciprocal beneficiaries” program, while Colorado 
offers a “designated beneficiaries” program. Both Hawaii and 
Colorado’s programs offer registrants a variety of benefits, but neither 
program offers all of the legal benefits of marriage.76 In Hawaii, two 
adults may become reciprocal beneficiaries so long as they are not 
parties to another reciprocal beneficiary relationship and are 
prohibited from marrying one another—such as same-sex couples or 
an unmarried mother and son.77 In Colorado, two people may become 
“designated beneficiaries” so long as both parties are competent, 
unmarried adults who are not already registered as another person’s 
“designated beneficiary.”78 
There are no state-wide civil unions, domestic partnerships, or 
beneficiary programs in Ohio. Instead, a variety of local, public 
institutions offer domestic partnership registries and benefits 
programs. There are only three domestic partnership registries in 
Ohio, which are respectively run by the City of Cleveland Heights,79 
the City of Cleveland,80 and the City of Toledo.81 These domestic 
partnership registries were intended to show local acceptance of gay 
and lesbian couples who are prohibited from marrying.82 However, 
                                                                                                                 
74 CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5 (West 2010); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, § 2-102 (2010); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 852.09 (West 2010).  
75 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-10-1 (2010) (limiting the right of intestacy only to legally 
recognized husbands and wives). 
76 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-2 (2010) (“[T]he legislature believes that certain rights and 
benefits presently available only to married couples should be made available to couples 
comprised of two individuals who are legally prohibited from marrying one another.”). COLO. 
REV. STAT. § 15-22-105 (2009) (enumerating the rights available to “designated beneficiaries,” 
such as the right to make medical decisions for one another, to visit each other in the hospital, 
and to receive each others’ bodies after death).  
77 HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C-4 (2010).  
78 COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-22-104 (2009) (listing the requirements to become a 
“designated beneficiary”). 
79 CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, ch. 181 (2003).  
80 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 109 (2009). 
81 TOLEDO, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 114 (2007). 
82 For example, according to City of Cleveland Councilman Joe Cimperman, the main 
sponsor of Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry, “[t]he passage of the Domestic Registry 
legislation . . . [is an] example[] of the City’s commitment to and support of [Cleveland’s 
LGBT] community.” Press Release, City of Cleveland, City Council and Cleveland LGBT 
Community Proudly Announce 1st Annual LGBT Heritage Day (Oct. 6, 2009), http://www. 
clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/News/October62009/tabid/775/Default.aspx; see also Press 
Release, City of Cleveland, Domestic Partnership Registration Opens on May 7th (May 6, 
2009), http://www.clevelandcitycouncil.org/Home/News/May62009/tabid/677/Default.aspx 
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these registries are mostly symbolic and do not grant registered 
partners any legal status, protections, or benefits.83 
Ohio’s domestic partner registries have nothing to do with Ohio’s 
public domestic partnership benefits programs. Simply joining the 
Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, or Toledo domestic partnership 
registry does not entitle a couple to domestic partnership benefits, 
even from a public employer with a partnership benefits program. 
Instead, employers in Ohio have complete control over whether to 
offer domestic partnership benefits, the extent of the benefits offered, 
and all eligibility criteria. Some public employers in Ohio limit 
benefits only to same-sex couples,84 and some grant equal benefits to 
same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex couples.85 Others grant same-
sex couples a wider array of benefits than their unmarried, opposite-
sex counterparts.86 Additionally, for some employers, the marital 
                                                                                                                 
 
(noting Councilman Joe Cimperman’s involvement with Cleveland’s domestic partnership 
registry and stating that couples can get necessary registration forms through the LGBT 
Community Center of Greater Cleveland); see also infra Part VI(A)(2) (discussing the purpose 
behind Ohio’s domestic partnership programs). 
83 See Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland, No. 94327, 2010 
Ohio App. LEXIS 3981, at *12 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010) (“At most, [Cleveland’s] 
domestic partner registry allows two people the legal right to be registered and recognized as a 
domestic unit, which may help local businesses and private employers more easily identify 
those couples who may qualify for domestic partnership benefits provided by such entities.”). 
Private employers are not required to provide registered domestic partnership benefits of any 
sort. 
84 Miami University offers domestic partnership benefits only to same-sex couples. See 
MIAMI UNIVERSITY BENEFITS SERVICES, AFFIDAVIT OF SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 1 
(2004), http://www.units.muohio.edu/prs/benefits/Benefit%20Forms/Affidavit%20of%20Same 
%20Sex%20Domestic%20Partnership.pdf. 
85 Wright State University offers domestic partnership benefits to same-sex and opposite-
sex domestic partnerships. See WRIGHT STATE UNIVERSITY DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES, AFFIDAVIT OF DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 1–2 (2007), http://www.wright.edu/hr/ 
forms/affidavit08.doc.  
86 The Ohio State University has a two-tiered domestic partnership benefits program that 
it offers to “domestic partners” and “sponsored dependents.” Only same-sex couples are able to 
join Ohio State’s health plan as “domestic partners.” See THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICE 
OF HUMAN RESOURCES, AFFIDAVIT OF SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP FOR BENEFIT 
COVERAGE 1 (2010), http://hr.osu.edu/Forms/Ben/ssdpaffidavit.pdf. Furthermore, as “domestic 
partners” these couples receive all of the same health benefits as married couples. See THE OHIO 
STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, MONTHLY HEALTH PLAN CONTRIBUTION 
RATES FOR SAME-SEX DOMESTIC PARTNER COVERAGE 1 (2010), http://hr.osu.edu/benefits/ 
Rates-SSDP-M.pdf (“The university’s contribution toward covering an employee’s same-sex 
domestic partner and his or her children is the same as for covering a spouse and eligible 
children of the employee.”). In contrast, to qualify for the sponsored dependency program, 
opposite-sex couples must prove that the non-employee-partner is dependent on the employee 
for over 50% of his or her income. See THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF HUMAN 
RESOURCES, AFFIDAVIT OF SPONSORED DEPENDENCY FOR BENEFIT COVERAGE 1 (2010), 
http://hr.osu.edu/Forms/affterm.pdf. Additionally, Ohio State does not grant sponsored 
dependents the same number of benefits as “domestic partners.” See THE OHIO STATE 
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status and sexual orientation of their employees are irrelevant for 
health insurance purposes. For example, the City of Columbus offers 
the same benefits to its married employees as it does to its unmarried 
(heterosexual and homosexual) employees in domestic partnerships.87 
III. THE TYPES OF MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS 
Thirty states have amendments banning same-sex marriage.88 
These amendments fall into one of three categories: structure 
amendments, status amendments, and substance amendments.89  
Structure amendments are the narrowest and do not 
constitutionally define marriage. Instead, structure amendments give 
the state legislature permission to define marriage as being between 
                                                                                                                 
 
UNIVERSITY OFFICE OF HUMAN RESOURCES, HEALTH PLAN CONTRIBUTION RATES FOR 
SPONSORED DEPENDENT COVERAGE 1 (2010), http://hr.osu.edu/oe/Rates-SD.pdf (“The 
university does not provide a subsidy toward the cost of providing health plan coverage to 
sponsored dependents—employees are responsible for the full contribution amount(s).”).  
87 Telephone Interview with Midge Slemmer, Emp. Benefits & Risk Manager, City of 
Columbus (May 18, 2011). 
88 These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix A (listing state 
marriage amendments).  
In contrast, same-sex marriage is allowed in Washington, D.C., Massachusetts, Vermont, 
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Iowa.  
In 2011, legislators in Maryland and Rhode Island introduced bills to legalize same-sex 
marriage. Although neither bill has yet passed, the governors of both states have announced 
their respective support for them. See Annie Linskey & Julie Bykowicz, Six Senators Hold the 
Key to Passage of Gay-Marriage Bill, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 6, 2011, at 1A; Katherine Gregg, 
Same-Sex Marriage Bill Gains Speed, PROVIDENCE JOURNAL, Jan 6, 2011, at A.  
California is in legal limbo. California used to grant marriage licenses to same-sex 
couples, and recognizes the same-sex marriages that were performed during that time. However, 
after Proposition 8, California has stopped issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. 
Proposition 8 is currently in litigation. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 1004 
(N.D. Cal. 2010) (holding California’s same-sex marriage ban unconstitutional); see also supra 
note 5. 
While same-sex marriage licenses cannot be issued by the state of New York, New York 
recognizes same-sex marriages that occur out-of-state. See Martinez v. County of Monroe, 850 
N.Y.S.2d 740, 743 (2008) (holding that, in the absence of express legislation to the contrary, 
New York must recognize same-sex marriages that take place in other jurisdictions). Recently, 
the Attorneys General of Maryland and New Mexico issued opinions stating their states may 
recognize same-sex marriages created in other jurisdictions. Marriage—Whether Out-of-State 
Same-Sex Marriage that Is Valid in the State of Celebration May Be Recognized in Maryland, 
95 Op. Att’y Gen. Md. 3 (2010); Are Same-Sex Marriages Performed in Other Jurisdictions 
Valid in New Mexico?, Opinion No. 11-01 N.M.A.G. (Jan. 4, 2011). 
89 See Joshua K. Baker, Status, Substance, and Structure: An Interpretive Framework for 
Understanding the State Marriage Amendments, 17 REGENT U.L. REV. 221, 222–23 (2004) 
(defining the three different types of state marriage amendments).  
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one man and one woman if it so chooses.90 Hawaii is the only state 
with a structure marriage amendment.91 The Hawaii Marriage 
Amendment states: “The legislature shall have the power to reserve 
marriage to opposite-sex couples.”92  
Conversely, status amendments, which have been adopted by 10 
states,93 constitutionally define marriage as a union between only one 
man and one woman.94 Status amendments do not vary greatly 
between states, are often one sentence long, and leave open the 
possibility for marriage alternatives.95 In 2004, Montana adopted an 
archetypal status marriage amendment, which declares: “Only a 
marriage between one man and one woman shall be valid or 
recognized as a marriage in this state.”96  
Substance amendments differ greatly not only from “structure” 
and “status” marriage amendments, but from each other as well. The 
only unifying feature among substance amendments are their first 
sentences, which define marriage as being between one man and one 
                                                                                                                 
90 See id. at 237–38 (discussing the nature of structure amendments).  
91 See id. at 238 (noting that Hawaii is the only state with a structure amendment). 
92 HAW. CONST. art. I, § 23.  
93 These states are: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri, 
Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Tennessee. See infra Appendix A (listing state marriage 
amendments). 
94 See Baker, supra note 89 , at 223. 
95 See id. at 223–29 (discussing the central features of status amendments). It is possible, 
however, for a status amendment to be longer than one sentence. An amendment is a status 
amendment so long as it does nothing more than define marriage as an institution between one 
man and one woman. If this requirement is met, then the length of the amendment is immaterial. 
For example, both Mississippi and Tennessee have status marriage amendments significantly 
longer than one sentence:  
Marriage may take place and may be valid under the laws of this State only between 
a man and a woman. A marriage in another State or foreign jurisdiction between 
persons of the same gender, regardless of when the marriage took place, may not be 
recognized in this State and is void and unenforceable under the laws of this State. 
MISS. CONST. art. XIV, § 263-A; 
The historical institution and legal contract solemnizing the relationship of one 
(1) man and one (1) woman shall be the only legally recognized marital contract in 
this state. Any policy or law or judicial interpretation, purporting to define marriage 
as anything other than the historical institution and legal contract between one 
(1) man and one (1) woman, is contrary to the public policy of this state and shall be 
void and unenforceable in Tennessee. If another state or foreign jurisdiction issues a 
license for persons to marry and if such marriage is prohibited in this state by the 
provisions of this section, then the marriage shall be void and unenforceable in this 
state.”  
TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 18. 
96 MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7. 
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woman.97 These first sentences make substance amendments 
somewhat similar to status amendments. 
The uniqueness of substance amendments exists in their second 
sentences, which limit state recognition of nonmarital relationships. 
These second sentences contain significant textual variations, suggest 
widely differing legal effects, and often employ words and phrases 
that have never before been legally defined.98 For example, 
Nebraska’s substance amendment prohibits the state from recognizing 
same-sex marriages, same-sex civil unions, and same-sex domestic 
partnerships; but it does not prohibit the state from recognizing 
opposite-sex civil unions or opposite-sex domestic partnerships.99 To 
date, nineteen states have adopted substance marriage amendments, 
including Ohio.100 
Ohio’s Amendment does not differentiate between unmarried 
persons in opposite or same-sex relationships; it prohibits the state 
from recognizing “a legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals.”101 Several scholars believe that Ohio has one of the 
broadest substance amendments in the United States.102 
IV. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT CONCERNING  
GAY RIGHTS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
This Part shows how the second sentence of Ohio’s Marriage 
Amendment violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. First, Section A explains the basics of equal protection 
analysis and rational basis review. Section B analyzes Romer v. 
Evans,103 where the Supreme Court invalidated Colorado’s 
                                                                                                                 
97 Although Idaho’s marriage amendment is only one sentence long, it still qualifies as a 
substance marriage amendment because it potentially limits state recognition of non-marital 
unions. “A marriage between a man and a woman is the only domestic legal union that shall be 
valid or recognized in this state.” IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28.  
98 See Baker, supra note 89, at 230 (discussing substance amendments); see also Strasser, 
supra note 14, at 59 (arguing that substance amendments will have grave and unintended 
consequences if their vague language is broadly interpreted by the courts). 
99 The Nebraska Marriage Amendment states: “Only marriage between a man and a 
woman shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The uniting of two persons of the same sex in 
a civil union, domestic partnership, or other similar same-sex relationship shall not be valid or 
recognized in Nebraska.” NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29. 
100 These states are: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Idaho, Louisiana, 
Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and Wisconsin. See infra Appendix A (listing state marriage amendments). 
101 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11(emphasis added). 
102 See, e.g., Baker, supra note 89, at 233–34 (discussing the Ohio amendment and other 
substance marriage amendments); Strasser, supra note 14, at 81–91 (discussing multiple 
possible interpretations of the Ohio amendment). 
103 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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Amendment 2, a ballot initiative that prohibited the state from 
granting anti-discrimination protection to gays and lesbians.104 
Section B also discusses Lawrence v. Texas,105 where the Supreme 
Court invalidated Texas’s criminal anti-sodomy law because it 
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.106 
Next, Section C discusses Washington v. Davis,107 Village of 
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.,108 
and Personnel Administrator v. Feeney,109 three cases in which the 
Supreme Court analyzed the constitutionality of facially neutral 
policies and laws. Lastly, Section D concludes that the second 
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment would be unconstitutional 
under Feeney if 1) it disproportionately impacts same-sex couples and 
2) the purpose behind the second sentence was to disproportionately 
impact same-sex couples. 
A. Introduction to Equal Protection Analysis 
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment states: 
“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”110 The Supreme Court explains this phrase as 
“essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should be 
treated alike.”111  
Assuming that a contested law does not burden a fundamental 
right, which would violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause, the law is presumptively valid under the Equal Protection 
Clause and subject only to “rational basis review.” Under this 
standard, the law will be upheld if it is rationally related to a 
legitimate state interest.112 However, if the law makes a distinction 
against a “suspect class”—i.e. racial, religious, and ethnic groups—
then the law is presumptively invalid under the Equal Protection 
Clause and subject to “strict scrutiny.” Under this standard, the law 
will be upheld only if it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
state interest.113 In cases where the challenged law classifies on the 
                                                                                                                 
104 Id. at 623–24, 635–36. 
105 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
106 Id. at 578–79. 
107 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
108 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
109 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
110 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
111 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985). 
112 See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631–32 (1996) (outlining the basic principles of 
rational basis review). 
113 See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (“[We] hold today 
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basis of sex or gender, the legislation is subject to “intermediate 
scrutiny.” Under this standard, the law is most likely presumptively 
invalid,114 and will be upheld only if it is substantially related to the 
achievement of important governmental objectives.115  
Many legal experts—including President Barack Obama and 
Attorney General Eric Holder—have argued that gays and lesbians 
deserve heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases.116 Some 
commentators claim that gays and lesbians are a suspect class 
deserving of strict scrutiny.117 Others allege that laws targeting gays 
and lesbians constitute gender discrimination and should be subject to 
intermediate scrutiny.118 Despite these arguments, the Supreme Court 
has never explicitly determined the appropriate standard for LGBT 
equal protection claims or whether LGBT persons constitute a suspect 
class.119  
B. The Game Changers:  
Romer v. Evans and Lawrence v. Texas 
1. Romer v. Evans 
The most influential equal protection case concerning the rights of 
gays and lesbians is Romer v. Evans.120 In Romer, the Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 
that all racial classifications . . . must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In 
other words, such classifications are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures 
that further compelling governmental interests.”). 
114 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994) (Kennedy, J., concurring 
in the judgment) (“Our case law [since 1971] does reveal a strong presumption that gender 
classifications are invalid.”). 
115 See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (finding that Oklahoma’s law allowing 
women to buy beer at age 18, but requiring men to be at least 21, failed intermediate scrutiny). 
116 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Attorney General on Litigation 
Involving the Defense of Marriage Act (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/ 
February/11-ag-222.html (“After careful consideration, including a review of my 
recommendation, the President has concluded that given a number of factors, including a 
documented history of discrimination, classifications based on sexual orientation should be 
subject to a more heightened standard of scrutiny.”). 
117 See, e.g., David A.J. Richards, Sexual Preference as a Suspect (Religious) 
Classification: An Alternative Perspective on the Unconstitutionality of Anti-Lesbian/Gay 
Initiatives, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (1994) (arguing that discrimination against gays and lesbians is 
a form of religious intolerance deserving strict scrutiny); John F. Niblock, Comment, Anti-Gay 
Initiatives: A Call for Heightened Judicial Scrutiny, 41 UCLA L. REV. 153 (1993) (arguing for 
treatment of sexual orientation as a suspect classification deserving strict scrutiny). 
118 See, e.g., Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is 
Sex Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197 (1994) (arguing that laws that discriminate against 
same-sex couples cannot survive intermediate scrutiny as applied to sex-based classifications).  
119 See infra Part IV.B. 
120 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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declared that Colorado’s Amendment 2 violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. The citizens of Colorado had 
adopted Amendment 2 into their state constitution through a statewide 
ballot initiative.121 The new constitutional amendment prohibited all 
executive, judicial, and legislative action designed to protect 
Colorado’s gays and lesbians from sexual orientation 
discrimination.122 As a result of Amendment 2, ordinances in Aspen, 
Boulder, and the City and County of Denver outlawing sexual 
orientation discrimination were immediately rescinded.123 If any city 
or county wanted to offer protection to its gay and lesbian residents, it 
would first have to successfully petition for an amendment to the 
Colorado Constitution.124 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, 
held that Colorado’s Amendment 2 was not only unconstitutional, but 
that it “confound[ed the] normal process of judicial review.”125 The 
Court started with the premise that “if a law neither burdens a 
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, [the Court] will uphold 
[a] legislative classification so long as it bears a rational relation to 
some legitimate end.”126 In the next sentence, however, the Court 
declared that “Amendment 2 fails, indeed defies, even this 
conventional inquiry” for two distinct reasons.127  
First the very nature of Amendment 2—which ordered the denial 
of all governmental protections to persons based upon their status in a 
single group—constituted a per se violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. The Court emphasized that “[i]n the ordinary case, a law will 
be sustained if it can be said to advance a legitimate government 
interest, even if the law seems unwise or works to the disadvantage of 
a particular group, or if the rationale for it seems tenuous.”128 The 
Court halted its analysis, however, because Amendment 2 was not 
“an ordinary case.” 
                                                                                                                 
121 Just like Colorado’s Amendment 2, Ohio’s Marriage Amendment was also adopted 
through a ballot initiative. The ballot initiative process is a form of direct democracy that allows 
individual citizens to propose, campaign for, and adopt state laws or constitutional amendments. 
See John Gildersleeve, Note, Editing Direct Democracy: Does Limiting the Subject Matter of 
Ballot Initiatives Offend the First Amendment?, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1437, 1441 n.21 (2007) 
(explaining the mechanics of direct democracy). For more information on ballot initiatives, see 
infra Part VI.B.1. 
122 Romer, 517 U.S. at 626–28. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 631. 
125 Id. at 633. 
126 Id. at 631. 
127 Id.at 632. 
128 Id. (emphasis added). 
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Instead, Amendment 2 had “the peculiar property of imposing a 
broad and undifferentiated disability on a single named group.”129 
According to the Court, Amendment 2 “identifies persons by a single 
trait and then denies them [governmental] protection across the board. 
The resulting disqualification of a class of persons from the right to 
seek specific protection from the law is unprecedented in our 
jurisprudence.”130 The Court concluded this argument without 
conducting any further equal protection analysis. Solely because of 
Amendment’s 2 unique denial of governmental protection to gays and 
lesbians, the Court held: “A law declaring that in general it shall be 
more difficult for one group of citizens than for all others to seek aid 
from the government is itself a denial of equal protection of the laws 
in the most literal sense.”131 
Second, the Court held Amendment 2 unconstitutional because, 
even if Romer were an “ordinary equal protection case calling for the 
most deferential of standards,”132 Amendment 2 failed rational basis 
review.  
One of the most basic tenants of equal protection law is that “a 
bare . . . desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute 
a legitimate governmental interest.”133 According to the Court, 
Amendment 2’s sweeping discriminatory effect proved that “the 
disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of 
persons affected.”134 The Court came to this decision even though 
millions of Coloradans, each with their own unique reasons for 
supporting Amendment 2, had voted in favor of the law. Further, 
although the State of Colorado offered non-animus based reasons for 
the law—such as the conservation of resources to fight racial 
discrimination—the Court declared that “the breadth of [Amendment 
2] is so far removed from these particular justifications that we find it 
impossible to credit them.”135 Armed with the determination that 
Amendment 2 was a hate-based ballot initiative, the Court stated 
“[w]e must conclude that Amendment 2 classifies homosexuals not to 
further a proper legislative end but to make them unequal to everyone 
                                                                                                                 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 633. 
131 Id. 
132 Id. at 632. 
133 Id. at 634 (omission in original) (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 
534 (1973)). 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 635. 
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else. This Colorado cannot do. . . . Amendment 2 violates the Equal 
Protection Clause . . . .”136 
2. Lawrence v. Texas 
Several years after Romer, the Supreme Court, in another opinion 
written by Justice Kennedy, decided Lawrence v. Texas,137 which 
held Texas’s criminal sodomy law unconstitutional under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
The Supreme Court could have based its Lawrence decision on 
equal protection grounds because Texas’s sodomy law uniquely 
criminalized homosexual, not heterosexual, oral and anal sex.138 
Indeed, Justice O’Connor’s concurrence was based solely on this 
equal protection analysis.139 The majority, however, declined to use 
equal protection because it feared that the states would simply rewrite 
their laws to prohibit oral and anal sex between all couples.140  
Instead, the majority relied upon a Fourteenth Amendment 
substantive due process analysis to reach its conclusion. Through this 
process, the Court overruled Bowers v. Hardwick,141 a 1986 case 
upholding Georgia’s criminal anti-sodomy law, and declared that 
“[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with 
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond 
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution 
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.”142  
Holding that moral disapproval is not enough to uphold criminal 
sodomy laws143—an idea accentuated in O’Connor’s 
concurrence144—the Court found that consenting gay and lesbian 
                                                                                                                 
136 Id. In contrast to Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia did not believe that Colorado’s animus 
or hostility towards its gay and lesbian citizens rendered Amendment 2 unconstitutional. In his 
dissent, Scalia even went so far as to find that that “Coloradans are . . . entitled to be hostile 
toward homosexual conduct.” Id. at 644 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
137 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
138 Id. at 563.  
139 Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Rather than relying on the 
substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as the Court does, I 
base my conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”).  
140 Id. at 574–75 (majority opinion). 
141 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
142 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567. 
143 Id. at 571 (“The condemnation [of homosexuality] has been shaped by religious beliefs, 
conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the traditional family. For many 
persons these are . . . deep convictions . . . which thus determine the course of their lives. These 
considerations do not answer the question before us, however . . . ‘Our obligation is to define 
the liberty of all, not to mandate our own moral code.’” (quoting Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850 (1992))). 
144 Id. at 582 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Moral disapproval of [gays and 
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adults “are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot 
demean their existence or control their destiny . . . . As the 
Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its 
principles in their own search for greater freedom.”145  
Although the majority opinion stated that Lawrence did not decide 
the issue of same-sex marriage,146 Justice Scalia’s biting dissent 
argued that the majority’s opinion mandated it. According to Scalia, 
“[t]his case ‘does not involve’ the issue of homosexual marriage only 
if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do 
with the decisions of this Court.”147 
C. Embracing Washington v. Davis, Village of Arlington Heights  
v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., and  
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney 
Despite the significance of both Romer and Lawrence for 
proponents of LGBT rights, these cases are of limited use concerning 
the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Both Romer and Lawrence dealt with 
legislation that specifically targeted gays and lesbians. In contrast, 
Ohio’s Amendment is facially neutral on the topic of sexual 
orientation. Under the Amendment, Ohio and its political 
subdivisions are forbidden from “creat[ing] or recogniz[ing] a legal 
status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage.”148 As such, the Ohio Marriage Amendment defies Romer-
style equal protection analysis because it applies to all unmarried 
individuals, regardless of their sexual orientation. 
However, an equal protection inquiry into Ohio’s Marriage 
Amendment does not end simply because its text is facially neutral on 
sexual orientation. The Supreme Court has used equal protection to 
invalidate many facially neutral laws written to disadvantage 
unpopular, unnamed groups. For example, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins,149 
the Court invalidated a San Francisco ordinance that required all city 
                                                                                                                 
 
lesbians] . . . is an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Indeed, we have never held that moral disapproval, without any other 
asserted state interest, is a sufficient rationale under the Equal Protection Clause to justify a law 
that discriminates . . . .”).  
145 Id. at 578–79. 
146 Id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give 
formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”). 
147 Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
148 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (emphasis added). 
149 118 U.S. 356 (1886). 
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laundries, except those located in brick buildings, to obtain a special 
operating permit. 
Although the San Francisco ordinance facially had nothing to do 
with race, its effect was dramatic. The law essentially closed all of 
San Francisco’s Chinese laundries, which were uniformly in wooden 
buildings, while allowing white laundries, which were typically in 
brick buildings, to remain open.150 Furthermore, among the white-
owned laundries located in wooden buildings, all but one received the 
necessary permit.151 In contrast, San Francisco did not grant any 
permits to Chinese laundries located in wooden buildings.152  
Similarly, in Gomillion v. Lightfoot,153 the Supreme Court 
invalidated Alabama’s redrawing of Tuskegee’s city limits. Although 
the legislation did not mention race, the Court held the measure 
unconstitutional because it removed from Tuskegee “all save only 
four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white 
voter or resident.”154 
In the 1970s, the Supreme Court decided three cases that heavily 
influenced the Court’s jurisprudence on facially neutral statutes: 
Washington v. Davis,155 Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan 
Housing Development Corp.,156 and Personnel Administrator v. 
Feeney.157 In these cases, each plaintiff alleged that a facially neutral 
law was actually a sophisticated form of racial or sex-based 
discrimination deserving heightened scrutiny. 
Davis challenged the validity of an exam, Test 21, used by 
Washington, D.C.’s Police Department to accept new recruits.158 The 
plaintiffs alleged that Test 21 was racially discriminatory because 
whites passed the test in disproportionately greater numbers than 
blacks.159  
Similarly, in Arlington Heights, a real estate developer alleged that 
the Village of Arlington Heights’ refusal to reform its zoning codes 
was racially discriminatory.160 By refusing to change its zoning codes, 
                                                                                                                 
150 Id. at 359. 
151 Id. 
152 Id.  
153 364 U.S. 339 (1960). 
154 Id. at 341. In addition to ruling on the act’s discriminatory impact, the Court also noted 
the odd shape of the redistricting lines, which turned the square boundaries of Tuskegee “into a 
strangely irregular twenty-eight-sided figure.” Id.  
155 426 U.S. 229 (1976). 
156 429 U.S. 252 (1977). 
157 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
158 Davis, 426 U.S. at 234–35. 
159 Id. 
160 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 258. 
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the Village effectively prohibited the construction of a low-income 
housing project with a disproportionately minority population.161  
Finally, in Feeney, a female civil servant fought a Massachusetts 
statute that gave an absolute hiring preference to veterans for civil 
service positions.162 Since ninety-eight percent of all Massachusetts 
veterans at the time were male, “[t]he impact of the veterans’ 
preference law upon the public employment opportunities of 
women . . . [was] severe.”163 
The plaintiffs in Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney all 
ultimately lost before the Supreme Court. Although the Supreme 
Court recognized that these plaintiffs suffered disproportionately,164 
the Court refused to apply heightened scrutiny or declare the policies 
unconstitutional because none of the policies were adopted with a 
discriminatory intent.  
In Davis, the Court did not find discriminatory intent because Test 
21 was an exam commonly used in hiring practices throughout the 
federal service.165 Additionally, the D.C. Police Department did not 
create Test 21; it was developed by the Civil Service Commission 
without regards to the race of the test-taker.166 Furthermore, while 
using Test 21, the D.C. Police Department was also engaged in a 
significant campaign to recruit and hire black officers.167  
In Arlington Heights, the Court determined that the Village of 
Arlington Heights had not discriminated against racial minorities 
when it refused to reform its zoning laws because the Village of 
Arlington Heights had been undeniably committed to keeping the 
residential area zoned only for single-family homes since 1959; the 
rezoning request process did not waver from usual procedures; the 
Village had given the real estate developer extra opportunities to 
present his case during the public hearing process; and the statements 
at the rezoning hearings focused almost exclusively on the zoning—
and not racial—aspects of the developer’s proposal.168  
Finally, in Feeney, the Supreme Court determined that the 
challenged law was constitutional because it was not intentionally 
designed to discriminate against women. Instead, Massachusetts’ civil 
                                                                                                                 
161 Id. 
162 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 259. 
163 Id. at 271.  
164 See Davis, 426 U.S. at 245–46; Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 565–66; Feeney, 442 
U.S. at 271. 
165 Davis, 426 U.S. at 234–35, 246.  
166 Id. at 234–35. 
167 Id. at 246. 
168 Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 269–71. 
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servant law was created to reward the commitment and sacrifice of all 
veterans.169 According to the Court, “[w]hen the totality of legislative 
actions establishing and extending the Massachusetts veterans’ 
preference are considered, the law remains what it purports to be: a 
preference for veterans of either sex over nonveterans of either sex, 
not for men over women.”170 
Although this Note does not argue that same-sex couples deserve 
heightened scrutiny in challenging Ohio’s Marriage Amendment, this 
Note is dependent on the clear two-prong test set forth in Feeney. To 
determine if a facially neutral law violates the Equal Protection 
Clause it is necessary to ask: 1) Does the law disparately impact an 
unnamed group of persons?, and 2) Does the “totality of legislative 
actions establishing”171 the disparately affecting law reflect an 
invidious discriminatory purpose?172 According to Feeney, invidious 
discriminatory purpose “implies that the decisionmaker . . . selected 
or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part ‘because of,’ 
not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse effects upon an identifiable 
group.”173 If both prongs are met, then the law violates Equal 
Protection.174  
D. Conclusion 
An equal protection challenge can be made against the second 
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment by establishing: 1) that 
the removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership programs under the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment would disparately impact same-sex couples, 
                                                                                                                 
169 Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279–80 (1979). 
170 Id. at 280 (citation omitted). 
171 Id. 
172 Id. at 274 (“When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that 
its effects upon women are disproportionably adverse . . . [it must be asked] whether the adverse 
effect reflects invidious gender-based discrimination.”); see also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 
229, 241–42 (1976) (“A statute, otherwise neutral on its face, must not be applied so as 
invidiously to discriminate on the basis of race. . . . Nevertheless, we have not held that a law, 
neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is 
invalid under the Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of 
one race than of another.”); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 264–65 (“Washington v. Davis made 
it clear that official action will not be held unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially 
disproportionate impact. . . . Proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose is required to 
show a violation of the Equal Protection Clause.” (citation omitted)). 
173 Feeney, 442 U.S. at 279.  
174 In certain rare instances, however, the Supreme Court inferred discriminatory intent and 
declared a violation of equal protection based upon disproportionate impact alone. See, e.g., 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). Since 
Yick Wo and Gomillion occurred before Davis, Arlington Heights, and Feeney, they should be 
seen more as the exception than the rule. 
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and 2) that the purpose behind the second sentence of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment is to harm same-sex couples.  
Parts V and VI establish that the second sentence of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment satisfies both of Feeney’s prongs, thereby 
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
V. DISPROPORTIONATE IMPACT IN OHIO’S DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP 
REGISTRIES AND BENEFITS PROGRAMS 
Part V establishes that Ohio’s domestic partnership programs 
overwhelmingly impact same-sex couples. Sections A and B provide 
background information on Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and 
show that same-sex couples make up the significant majority of 
couples enrolled in them. Section C explains how the data concerning 
Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits programs was gathered as well 
as the data’s limitations. Section D establishes that same-sex couples 
make up the majority of the couples receiving domestic partnership 
health insurance at Ohio’s public institutions. Section E concludes 
that the removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership programs would 
disproportionately impact Ohio’s LGBT community and not the 
general “unmarried” class. 
A. Ohio’s Domestic Partner Registries 
Three cities in Ohio have domestic partner registries: Cleveland 
Heights,175 Cleveland,176 and Toledo.177 The City of Cleveland 
Heights has the oldest domestic partner registry in Ohio. Cleveland 
Heights opened its domestic partner registry on January 26, 2004, 
after voters approved the initiative in a local referendum in November 
2003.178 According to Heights Families for Equality, which placed the 
registry on the 2003 ballot, Cleveland Heights’ registry was the first 
piece of pro-gay-rights legislation ever approved in a voter ballot 
initiative.179 Almost four years later, the Toledo City Council 
approved the creation of its domestic partner registry,180 which went 
into effect on December 21, 2007.181 Less than one year later, on 
                                                                                                                 
175 CLEVELAND HEIGHTS, OHIO, ADMIN. CODE tit. 13, ch. 181 (2003). 
176 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 109 (2009). 
177 TOLEDO, OHIO, CODE OF ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 114 (2007). 
178 HEIGHTS FAMILIES FOR EQUALITY, http://www.heightsfamilies.org (last visited Apr. 3, 
2011).  
179 Id. 
180 Eric Resnick, Toledo Council Passes Partner Registry, GAY PEOPLE’S CHRON.COM 
(Nov. 16, 2007), http://www.gaypeopleschronicle.com/stories07/november/1116071.htm. 
181 Ignazio Messina, Dozens Sign Toledo’s Domestic Partner Registry, TOLEDO BLADE, 
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December 8, 2008, the Cleveland City Council adopted Cleveland’s 
domestic partner registry;182 the registry opened on May 7, 2009.183 
Both Cleveland and Cleveland Heights’s domestic partner registries 
were challenged for allegedly violating the Ohio Constitution.184 To 
date, no one has challenged Toledo’s domestic partner registry.  
All three registries are open to same-sex and opposite-sex 
couples.185 Prospective registrants must pay a registration fee and file 
a Declaration of Domestic Partnership. Additionally, eligible 
registrants must be 18 years or older, in a committed relationship, 
share a common residence, not be married or in a domestic 
partnership with someone else, and not be related by blood.186 None 
of these registries grant legal rights to registered couples. The City of 
Cleveland’s domestic partner registry ordinance even explicitly says 
that “[n]othing in this chapter shall be construed as recognizing or 
treating a Declaration of Domestic Partnership as a marriage or a 
legal status that intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance, or effect of marriage.”187  
While Ohio’s domestic partner registries may provide registered 
domestic partners with a sense of appreciation and respect, they are, 
in fact, little more than a city-sponsored list of names. 
B. Domestic Partner Registries, Data 
According to data collected in November 2009, Ohio’s domestic 
partner registries are overwhelmingly used by same-sex couples. In 
                                                                                                                 
 
Dec. 21, 2008, available at 2008 WLNR 24490712. 
182 Damon Sims, Cleveland Council Votes to Enact Domestic Partner Registry, 
CLEVELAND.COM (last updated Dec. 9, 2008, 8:46 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2008/ 
12/cleveland_council_votes_to_ena.html.  
183 Henry J. Gomez, Cleveland’s Domestic Partner Registry to Launch Next Week Amid 
City Hall Celebration, CLEVELAND.COM (last updated Apr. 29, 2009, 4:14 PM), http://www. 
cleveland.com/cityhall/index.ssf/2009/04/clevelands_domestic_partner_re.html.  
184 See City of Cleveland Heights ex rel Hicks v. City of Cleveland Heights, 832 N.E.2d 
1275 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007); Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland, 
No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010). 
185 See supra notes 175–77. 
186 See Criteria and Procedures for Domestic Partner Registry, CITY OF CLEVELAND 
HEIGHTS, http://www.clevelandheights.com/citydept_community_domestic.asp?id=16 (last 
visited Mar. 19, 2011) (explaining registration criteria and process); Declaration of Domestic 
Partnership, CITY OF TOLEDO, http://www.ci.toledo.oh.us/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=UD5n4l 
Lrr-g%3d&tabid=466 (last visited Mar. 19, 2001) (declaration form); Domestic Partner 
Registry, CITY OF CLEVELAND, http://www.cleveland-oh.gov/CityofCleveland/Home/ 
Government/CityAgencies/Finance/AssessmentsandLicenses#domestic (last visited Mar. 19, 
2011) (explaining criteria and process for registration of domestic partnership).  
187 CLEVELAND, OHIO, CODIFIED ORDINANCES tit. 1, ch. 109.06 (2010). 
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Table 1, the couples participating in these registries are listed as 
“same-sex,” “opposite-sex,” or “unknown.”188 An “unknown” 
registered couple means that the couple registered either in the City of 
Cleveland or Toledo and that the sex of both partners could not be 
verified.189 The City of Cleveland Heights records the gender make-
up of its registered domestic partnerships.  
The City of Cleveland Heights has the largest domestic partner 
registry. There are 217 registered domestic partnerships; 156 couples 
are same-sex and 61 are opposite-sex.190 Thus, 72% of the couples in 
Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry are same-sex.  
In Toledo, there are 110 registered couples; 80 couples are same-
sex, 24 are opposite-sex, and 6 are of unknown gender make-up.191 
Therefore, in Toledo, same-sex couples make up 73% of registered 
partners while opposite-sex couples make up only 22%; “unknown” 
registered couples comprise 6% of the total.  
Finally, the City of Cleveland has the greatest percentage of 
registered same-sex couples. There are 164 registered couples in 
Cleveland; 134 couples are same-sex—making up 82% of all 
registered couples, 24 are opposite-sex couples—making up only 
15% of all registered couples, and only 6 couples (3%) are of 
unknown gender make-up.192  
On average, same-sex couples comprise 75% of all couples in 
Ohio’s domestic partner registries.193 
C. Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Benefits Programs 
The data concerning Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits 
programs comes directly from the human resources departments of 
Ohio’s public school systems, municipalities, public universities, and 
community colleges. The data was collected primarily during the 
                                                                                                                 
188 Infra Table 1. 
189 In the “unknown” instances either one or both partners used androgynous names (i.e. 
Sam or Alex). If the partner could not be contacted or could not otherwise be confirmed as a 
man or a woman, then the couple was placed in the “unknown” category. 
190 E-mail from Susanna Niermann O’Neil, Vice City Manager, City of Cleveland Heights, 
to author (Nov. 20, 2009, 16:04 EST) (on file with author).  
191 E-mail from Gerald Dendinger, Clerk of Council, City of Toledo, to author (Nov. 25, 
2009, 15:45 EST) (on file with author) (containing the Toledo Domestic Partner Registry). The 
gender make-up of several couples could not be determined because some partners had 
androgynous names and their identities could not be determined. 
192 E-mail from Kim Roberson, Pub. Records Adm’r, City of Cleveland Dep’t of Law, to 
author (Dec. 22, 2009, 15:05  EST) (on file with author) (containing Cleveland’s Domestic 
Partner Registry). The gender make-up of several couples could not be determined because 
some partners had androgynous names and their identities could not be determined. 
193 See infra Table 1. 
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winter and spring of 2010. However, mainly because some 
institutions only recently adopted domestic partnership benefits, some 
data was gathered in 2011. Data from other public institutions, such 
as Ohio’s state-run hospitals, is not included.  
Since Ohio’s domestic partnerships benefits programs vary greatly 
from one another—for example, some packages offer life insurance 
whereas others do not—this Note focuses only on the number and 
make-up of domestic partnerships receiving health insurance. 
D. Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Benefits Programs, Data 
This section looks at the make-up of the couples receiving health 
insurance through Ohio’s public domestic partnership programs. 
Subsection 1 studies the make-up of couples receiving domestic 
partnership health insurance through Ohio’s public school systems. 
Subsection 2 looks at the couples receiving domestic partnership 
health insurance offered through Ohio’s counties and municipalities. 
Subsection 3 analyzes the couples who receive domestic partnership 
health insurance though Ohio’s public universities and community 
colleges. This Section concludes that, overall, same-sex couples make 
up the majority of couples who are receiving public domestic 
partnership health insurance, and that the removal of Ohio’s domestic 
partnership benefits programs would disparately impact Ohio’s LGBT 
community. 
1. Public School Systems194 
Oberlin City Schools and Columbus City Schools are the only two 
public school systems in Ohio that offer health insurance to its 
employees and their domestic partners.195 Oberlin City Schools has 
the older program and offers coverage to both same-sex and opposite-
sex domestic partners.196 In contrast, Columbus City Schools, which 
created its domestic partnership benefits program in June 2009, offers 
medical coverage only to same-sex domestic partners.197 
Although Oberlin City Schools offers health insurance to both 
same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners, only one couple is 
currently taking advantage of the program. This couple is same-
                                                                                                                 
194 See infra Table 2. 
195 See Simone Sebastian, Same-Sex Partners to Get Benefits, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, June 
6, 2009, at B1 (discussing the extension of benefits in Ohio’s public school districts). 
196 See id.  
197 See id. 
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sex.198 There are currently 27 same-sex couples receiving domestic 
partner health insurance through Columbus City Schools.199 
Therefore, 100% of the couples receiving domestic partnership health 
insurance through Ohio’s public school systems are same-sex. 
2. Cities and Counties200 
Both the City of Columbus and the City of Cleveland Heights offer 
domestic partnership benefits to their employees. The City of 
Columbus offers equal domestic partnership benefits to its unmarried 
same-sex and opposite-sex couples.201 In contrast, Cleveland Heights 
offers benefits only to same-sex domestic partners.202 Currently, there 
are 57 couples receiving domestic partnership health insurance 
through the City of Columbus.203 Forty of these couples (70%) are in 
opposite-sex relationships; seventeen couples (30%) are same-sex.204 
In Cleveland Heights, there are no couples receiving domestic 
partnership health insurance.205 According to Bob Johnson, Cleveland 
Heights’ Human Resources Manager, gay and lesbian employees 
declined the insurance because of inequality in the federal tax code.206 
Unlike the health insurance enjoyed by married couples, domestic 
partner health insurance constitutes taxable income for federal tax 
purposes.207 
Franklin County and Lucas County are the only counties in Ohio 
that offer domestic partnership benefits to their employees. In 
Franklin County, where domestic partnership benefits are open to 
                                                                                                                 
198 Telephone Interview with Diane Wolf, Treasurer, Oberlin City Sch. (Dec. 21, 2009). 
199 Telephone Interview with Michael Straughter, Commc’ns Specialist, Columbus City 
Sch. (Feb. 19, 2010). 
200 See infra Table 3 
201 Doug Caruso, Benefits OK’d for Domestic Partners, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov. 23, 
2010, at A1.  
202 Telephone Interview with Bob Johnson, Human Res. Manager, City of Cleveland 
Heights (Feb. 23, 2010). 
203 Telephone Interview with Midge Slemmer, supra note 87. 
204 Id. 
205 Telephone Interview with Bob Johnson, supra note 202. 
206 Id. 
207 According to Johnson, Cleveland Heights employees who wish to receive domestic 
partnership health insurance would need to record an additional $12,000 of taxable income in 
their federal income taxes. Id. Also, most of the human resource managers contacted for this 
Note agreed that the current tax code had dissuaded many unmarried couples from enrolling in 
their respective domestic partnership benefits programs. 
The federal tax consequences of domestic partnership health insurance are felt nationwide 
in both the private and public sectors. As a result, some private employers, such as Google, have 
started to compensate their employees for the additional income taxes they pay on their 
domestic partnership health insurance. See Tara Siegel Bernard, To Cover Tax, Google to Add 
to Gays’ Pay, N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2010, at B1. 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
1346 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
both same-sex and opposite-sex couples, there are 74 couples 
receiving domestic partnership health insurance.208 Twenty-five of 
those couples (34%) are same-sex and 49 couples (66%) are opposite-
sex.209 In contrast, Lucas County offers domestic partner benefits only 
to same-sex couples.210 There are five couples receiving domestic 
partnership health insurance through Lucas County.211 
Therefore, there are a total of 136 couples receiving domestic 
partnership health insurance through Ohio’s counties and 
municipalities. Forty-seven of these couples (35%) are in same-sex 
relationships and 89 of these couples (65%) are in opposite-sex 
relationships.212 
3. Public Universities and Community Colleges213 
According to the University System of Ohio, there are a total of 37 
public universities and community colleges in Ohio.214 Eighteen of 
these institutions offer domestic partnership health benefits to their 
employees,215 with seven offering domestic partnership health 
insurance only to same-sex couples,216 and eleven offering these 
benefits to both same-sex and unmarried opposite-sex couples.217 
                                                                                                                 
208 E-mail from Scott Solsman, Benefits Adm’r, Franklin Cnty. Coop. Health Benefits 
Program, to author (Dec. 29, 2009, 09:43 EST) (on file with author).  
209 E-mail from Scott Solsman, Benefits Adm’r, Franklin Cnty. Coop. Health Benefits 
Program, to author (Dec. 28, 2009, 14:03 EST) (on file with author).  
210 Telephone Interview with Colleen Abbott, Benefits Specialist, Lucas Cnty. (May 11, 
2011). 
211 Id. 
212 See infra Table 3. 
213 See infra Tables 4–7. 
214 Explore Ohio’s Higher Education System, UNIVERSITY SYSTEM OF OHIO, http://uso. 
edu/network/usoSchools/index.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2009). This total breaks down into 14 
public universities and 23 community colleges. 
215 The thirteen public universities that offer domestic partnership benefits are: University 
of Akron, Bowling Green State University, Central State University, University of Cincinnati, 
Cleveland State University, Kent State University, Miami University, Northeastern Ohio 
Universities Colleges of Medicine and Pharmacy (“NEOUCOM”), The Ohio State University, 
Ohio University, University of Toledo, Wright State University, and Youngstown State 
University. See infra Tables 4–5. 
The five community colleges that offer domestic partnership benefits are: Central Ohio 
Technical College, Cincinnati State Technical and Community College, Cuyahoga Community 
College, Lakeland Community College, and Washington State Community College. See infra 
Tables 4–5. 
216 These schools are: University of Akron, Bowling Green State University, Cleveland 
State University, Miami University, Youngstown State University, Cincinnati State Technical 
and Community College, and Lakeland Community College. See infra Tables 4, 6. 
217 These schools are: Central State University, University of Cincinnati, Kent State 
University, NEOUCOM, The Ohio University, Ohio University, University of Toledo, Wright 
State University, Central Ohio Technical College, Cuyahoga Community College, and 
Washington State Community College. See infra Tables 4, 7. 
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Nineteen of Ohio’s public universities and community colleges do not 
offer domestic partnership benefits.218  
In total there are 510 couples receiving domestic partner health 
insurance from Ohio’s public universities and community colleges.219 
Sixty-five percent of these couples (332) are in same-sex 
relationships.220 Only 25% of these couples (178) are in opposite-sex 
relationships.221 
There are 47 couples receiving domestic partnership health 
insurance from the seven schools that offer same-sex only partnership 
policies.222 Bowling Green State University is the latest public 
university in Ohio to offer domestic partnership health insurance. On 
October 1, 2010, the Bowling Green State University Board of 
Trustees voted unanimously to adopt domestic partnership benefits.223 
The benefits took effect on January 1, 2011;224 there are currently 
seven couples receiving domestic partnership health insurance.225  
The University of Akron has nine same-sex couples currently 
receiving domestic partnership health insurance.226 At Cleveland 
State University, there are 12 couples.227 Miami University currently 
has 24 couples receiving health insurance through the university’s 
                                                                                                                 
218 Only one of Ohio’s fourteen public universities, Shawnee State University, does not 
offer domestic partnership health insurance. In contrast, eighteen of Ohio’s twenty-three 
community colleges do not offer domestic partnership health insurance: Belmont Technical 
College, Clark State Community College, Columbus State Community College, Eastern 
Gateway Community College, Edison Community College, Hocking College, James A. Rhodes 
State College, Lorain County Community College, Marion Technical College, North Central 
State College, Northwest State Community College, Owens Community College, Rio Grande 
Community College, Sinclair Community College, Southern State Community College, Stark 
State College of Technology, Terra Community College, and Zane State College. See infra 
Table 4. 
219 See infra Table 5.  
220 See infra Table 5. 
221 See infra Table 5. 
222 See infra Table 6. 
223 See Sarah Ottney, BGSU Same-Sex Benefits are ‘Welcome and Needed,’ TOLEDO FREE 
PRESS, Oct. 29, 2010, http://www.toledofreepress.com/2010/10/29/bgsu-same-sex-benefits-are-
%E2%80%98welcome-and-needed%E2%80%99/ (describing BGSU’s extension of health care 
benefits to same-sex partners).  
224 See id.  
225 See infra Tables 5, 6. There are an additional nine couples at Bowling Green State 
University receiving domestic partnership dental insurance. Due to the limited focus of this 
Note, however, only the domestic partners who are receiving health insurance are counted. 
Telephone Interview with Rebecca Ferguson, Chief Human Res. Officer, Bowling Green State 
Univ. (Jan. 19, 2011).  
226 Telephone Interview with Kevin Turner, Assistant Dir. of Benefits Admin., Univ. of 
Akron (Jan. 21, 2010); see also infra Tables 5,6. 
227 E-mail from Gerald Modjeski, Dir. of Emp. Benefits, Cleveland State Univ., to author 
(Dec. 18, 2009, 10:56 EST) (on file with author); see also infra Tables 5, 6. 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
1348 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
domestic partnership program.228 At Youngstown State University, 
there is only one same-sex couple receiving health insurance through 
the university’s domestic partnership program.229  
Similarly, Cincinnati State Technical & Community College has 
only one same-sex couple receiving domestic partner health 
insurance.230 Finally, Lakeland Community College, which created its 
domestic partner benefits program in August 2009, has three couples 
receiving partnership health insurance.231 
Among the eleven public colleges and universities that offer 
domestic partnership benefits to both same-sex and opposite sex 
couples, there are 453 couples receiving domestic partnership health 
insurance.232 From this subgroup, 275 couples are same-sex (61%) 
and 178 couples are opposite-sex (39%).233 Furthermore, of these 
eleven institutions, two schools, Central State University and 
Northeastern Ohio Universities Colleges of Medicine and Pharmacy 
(“NEOUCOM”) have only same-sex couples receiving domestic 
partnership health insurance.234 And, at another two schools, The 
Ohio State University and Central Ohio Technical College, same-sex 
couples receive greater benefits packages than their opposite-sex 
counterparts.235 Furthermore, all same-sex couples at The Ohio State 
University and Central Ohio Technical College are eligible to receive 
domestic partnership benefits, but opposite-sex couples must meet 
                                                                                                                 
228 Telephone Interview with Sherry Schilling, Benefits Generalist, Miami Univ. (Dec. 17, 
2009). There are 34 total couples who have signed Miami University’s Affidavit of Domestic 
Partnership. However, since these 10 additional couples are not enrolled in the health insurance 
program, and instead only use their domestic partnership status for family sick days, they are not 
included in this Note’s results. Id.; see also infra Tables 5, 6. 
229 E-mail from Steve Lucivjansky, Manager of Labor Relations, Youngstown State Univ., 
to author (Dec. 22, 2009, 12:48 EST) (on file with author); see also infra Tables 5, 6.  
In addition to granting health insurance only to same-sex couples, Youngstown State 
University also provides same-sex domestic partners with vision and dental insurance and 
prescription coverage. Youngstown State University provides all of its employees who are in 
registered domestic partnerships with Family Medical and Sick Leave. However, health 
insurance is limited to only same-sex couples. Telephone Interview with Kathy Bouquet, 
Manager of Emp. Benefits, Youngstown State Univ. (Dec. 16, 2009).  
230 Telephone Interview with Davie Rainwater, Supervisor of Comp. & Benefits, 
Cincinnati State Technical & Cmty. Coll. (Dec. 22, 2009); see also infra Tables 5, 6. 
231 Telephone Interview with Carol Mangino, Assistant Dir. for Human Res., Lakeland 
Cmty. Coll. (Dec. 22, 2009); see also infra Tables 5, 6. 
232 See infra Table 7.  
233 See infra Table 7. 
234 Telephone Interview with Evelyn Adams, Human Res. Manager, Central State Univ. 
(Jan. 4, 2010); Telephone Interview with Kathy Korogi, Human Res. Coordinator, NEOUCOM 
(Jan. 4, 2010); see also infra Table 7. 
235 Central Ohio Technical College is an affiliate of The Ohio State University and, as a 
result, has the same domestic partnership benefits package. Telephone Interview with Sherry 
Abbott, Human Res. Generalist, Cent. Ohio Technical Coll. (Jan. 5, 2010); see also supra note 
86 (discussing The Ohio State University’s two-tiered domestic partnership benefits system). 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
2011] WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY 1349 
additional criteria to be eligible for domestic partnership health 
insurance.236 
4. Summary of Data 
The majority of couples receiving health insurance from Ohio’s 
domestic partnership programs are in same-sex relationships. In total 
there are 674 couples receiving domestic partnership health insurance 
through Ohio’s public domestic partnership programs.237 Of this total, 
407 couples (60%) are same-sex and 267 (40%) are opposite-sex.238 
D. Conclusion 
The removal of Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and 
domestic partnership health insurance programs would disparately 
impact same-sex couples for two reasons. First, same-sex couples are 
overwhelmingly represented in Ohio’s domestic partnership 
programs. Same-sex couples make up, on average, 75% of the 
couples in Ohio’s domestic partnership registries239 and 60% of the 
couples in Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits programs.240 These 
numbers take on even greater significance when one notes that gays 
and lesbians make up only a small percentage of Ohio’s overall 
population.241 Second, unlike their opposite-sex counterparts, same-
sex couples do not have the option of leaving Ohio’s “unmarried” 
class. If Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are removed, 
opposite-sex couples may keep their benefits packages and enhance 
their level of state recognition by getting married. Ohio’s same-sex 
couples do not have this option.  
                                                                                                                 
236 See supra note 86 (outlining the differences between same-sex and opposite-sex 
domestic partnership benefits at The Ohio State University). 
237 See infra Table 8. 
238 See infra Table 8. 
239 See infra Table 1. 
240 See infra Table 8. 
241 According to the Williams Institute, there were an estimated 335,110 gays, lesbians, 
and bisexuals living in Ohio in 2005, representing about 4% of Ohio’s population. GARY J. 
GATES, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, SAME-SEX COUPLES AND THE GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL 
POPULATION: NEW ESTIMATES FROM THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY app. 1 (2006), 
available at http://www3.law.ucla.edu/williamsinstitute/publications/SameSexCouplesandGLB 
popACS.pdf. The Williams Institute currently estimates that there are over 8 million gays, 
lesbians, and bisexuals in the United States, comprising roughly 3.5% of America’s adult 
population. GARY J. GATES, WILLIAMS INSTITUTE, HOW MANY PEOPLE ARE LESBIAN, GAY, 
BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER? 6 (2011), available at http://www3.law.ucla.edu/williams 
institute/pdf/How-many-people-are-LGBT-Final.pdf. 
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VI. INTENT AND DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMS 
Since using Ohio’s Marriage Amendment to remove public 
domestic partnership registries and benefits programs would 
disparately impact Ohio’s LGBT community, the next step is 
determine whether the Ohio Marriage Amendment satisfies Feeney’s 
second prong. Does the “totality of actions” surrounding the second 
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment reflect an invidious 
discriminatory purpose against gays and lesbians?242 The answer is 
“Yes” for three distinct reasons. 
Section A asserts that, because domestic partnership programs 
across the United States and in Ohio are designed primarily to benefit 
same-sex couples, attacks on domestic partnership programs are 
inherently attacks against gays and lesbians. Section B contends that 
CCV and the OCPM abused Ohio’s ballot initiative process. 
Specifically, this section alleges that ballot initiatives are vulnerable 
to proponent manipulation, and that CCV took advantage of these 
weaknesses and lied to voters about the Amendment’s scope in order 
to pass hate-based legislation. Finally Section C argues that if the 
Ohio Marriage Amendment destroys all of Ohio’s domestic 
partnership programs, then the resulting consequences would be so 
broad and so severe against Ohio’s LGBT community that, per Romer 
and Lawrence, the second sentence would automatically betray an 
intentional and unconstitutional antigay animus. 
                                                                                                                 
242 See Pers. Adm’n v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979). Those who claim that Ohio’s 
Marriage Amendment affects only unmarried couples, and not just gays and lesbians, might 
point to the number of opposite-sex couples who would be impacted by the removal of Ohio’s 
domestic partnership programs. Further, Feeney does provide some support for this claim. 
In Feeney, the Court concluded that the Massachusetts law did not discriminate against 
women in part because of the large number of men who were denied the veterans’ absolute 
hiring preference. According to the Court, “[v]eteran status is not uniquely male. Although few 
women benefit from the preference, the nonveteran class is not substantially all female. To the 
contrary, significant numbers of nonveterans are men, and all nonveterans—male as well as 
female—are placed at a disadvantage.” Id. at 275.  
However, Feeney is easily distinguishable from the present scenario for several reasons. 
First, whereas “veteran status” was not uniquely “male” in Feeney, marriage in Ohio is uniquely 
reserved for opposite-sex couples. OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 3101.01(C) (West 2010). Second, the Massachusetts civil service was not created as a way to 
empower women. In contrast, domestic partnership programs have always been designed to 
grant rights and recognition to same-sex couples. See infra Part VI.A. Finally, the original 
purpose of the Massachusetts’ veterans’ preference law was to reward the patriotism of Civil 
War veterans and ease their transition to civil life. Feeney, 442 U.S. at 265. It had nothing to do 
with the discrimination of women. In contrast, the Ohio Marriage Amendment has everything to 
do with the moral disapproval of homosexuality and the delegitimation of same-sex couples. See 
infra Parts VI.B & C. Thus the factors that the Court used to uphold Massachusetts’ veterans 
preference are not present in the case against the Ohio Marriage Amendment.  
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
2011] WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY 1351 
Therefore, this Note concludes the second sentence of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment contains an invidious discriminatory purpose in 
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
A. Attacks Against Domestic Partnership Programs Are  
Attacks Against Same-Sex Couples 
This Section looks at the purpose behind domestic partnership 
programs throughout the United States and specifically within Ohio. 
The legislative history of these programs establishes that all public 
domestic partnership programs—even those that are open to opposite-
sex couples—are primarily designed to recognize and help same-sex 
couples who are prohibited from marrying. Therefore, any attempt to 
eradicate domestic partnership programs must necessarily be aimed at 
the people these programs are designed to protect—gay and lesbian 
couples—in violation of Feeney’s second prong. 
1. The Purpose Behind Domestic Partnership Programs  
Throughout the United States 
History shows that attacks against domestic partnerships are per se 
attacks against gays and lesbians, and not just “unmarried” couples. 
Domestic partnership programs in the United States were—and 
continue to be—developed at the behest of LGBT activists in the 
hope of providing protection for and legitimacy to same-sex 
couples.243 The first domestic partnership programs in the United 
                                                                                                                 
243 See generally Leland Traiman, A Brief History of Domestic Partnerships, GAY & 
LESBIAN REV., July–Aug. 2008, at 23 (chronicling the early history of domestic partnerships in 
the United States and the vital role gays and lesbians played in creating domestic partnerships); 
see also Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More Perfect Union: A Legal and 
Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1164, 1164 (1992) 
(“Largely at the behest of gay-rights advocates, a number of municipalities are creating 
domestic partnership ordinances, conferring certain benefits on domestic partners that are within 
the authority of the local government to grant.” (footnotes omitted)); Heidi Eischen, Survey, For 
Better or Worse: An Analysis of Recent Challenges to Domestic Partner Benefits Legislation, 31 
U. TOL. L. REV. 527, 530 (2000) (arguing that domestic partnership ordinances are the result of 
LGBT advocacy). 
A particularly salient example of LGBT domestic partnership advocacy is currently 
unfolding in St. Louis, Missouri. On Christmas day in 2009, Missouri State Trooper Dennis 
Engelhard was killed on Highway I-44 in the line of duty. In honor of his sacrifice, the Missouri 
Legislature named the road on which he died the “Patrolman Corporal Dennis E. Engelhard 
Memorial Highway.” However, the State of Missouri is refusing to grant Kelly Glossip, 
Engelhard’s same-sex partner of nearly 15 years, over $28,000 in survivorship benefits. 
According to state law, only legally recognized spouses are entitled to survivorship rights. The 
Missouri Constitution prohibits same-sex marriage, however. Glossip is suing Missouri under 
equal protection for the creation of domestic partnership survivorship benefits. See Jake 
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States were created at the municipal level in the 1980s and early 
1990s.244 Although these early programs were open to both same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples,245 and were enjoyed mainly by opposite-
sex couples,246 they were created primarily to benefit the LGBT 
community. For example, San Francisco’s domestic partnership 
ordinance, which was approved by voters in a 1990 referendum, 
specifically states that its purpose “is to create a way to recognize 
intimate committed relationships, including those of same-sex couples 
who otherwise may be denied the right to marry under California 
law.”247  
As same-sex marriage, civil unions, and other domestic 
partnership programs have moved from the fringe to the mainstream, 
it has become even clearer that “marriage alternatives” are designed 
for same-sex couples who are prohibited from marrying. While many 
legal theorists have argued that domestic partnership benefits should 
and could be limited to same-sex couples,248 and several courts have 
agreed with these arguments,249 no commentator has ever 
                                                                                                                 
 
Wagman, Fallen Trooper’s Gay Partner Sues Over Benefit Denial, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, 
Dec. 3, 2010, at A5. 
244 See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 243, at 1188–95 (discussing the first domestic 
partnership programs in the United States); Eblin, supra note 64, at 1072–77 (chronicling the 
early history of domestic partnership programs in the United States). 
245 For example, in December 1984, Berkeley, California, became the first public employer 
in the United States to offer health insurance to domestic partners, and the city did not 
distinguish between same-sex and opposite-sex domestic partners. See Domestic Partnership 
Information, CITY OF BERKELEY, http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/ContentDisplay.aspx?id=4206 
(last visited Mar. 26, 2011) (describing the city’s policy); Eblin, supra note 64, at 1072 (same). 
246 See Eblin, supra note 64, at 1072–77 (explaining that the United States’ first public 
domestic partnership programs benefited more opposite-sex couples than same-sex couples). 
247 SAN FRANCISCO, CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 62.1 (2011) (emphasis added). 
248 See James M. Donovan, An Ethical Argument to Restrict Domestic Partnerships to 
Same-Sex Couples, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY: A REV. OF LESBIAN, GAY, BISEXUAL & 
TRANSGENDER LEGAL ISSUES 649, 666–67 (1998) (arguing that because same-sex couples may 
not marry, “domestic partnership benefits should be exclusively tailored [for gays and 
lesbians]”); Kimberly Menashe Glassman, Balancing the Demands of the Workplace with the 
Needs of the Modern Family: Expanding Family and Medical Leave to Protect Domestic 
Partners, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 837, 860–65 (2004) (explaining why it would not violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment if government entities chose to extend family and medical leave only to 
same-sex domestic partners). But see Terry S. Kogan, Competing Approaches to Same-Sex 
Versus Opposite-Sex, Unmarried Couples in Domestic Partnership Laws and Ordinances, 2001 
BYU L. REV. 1023, 1043 (2001) (“So long as domestic partnership schemes are the only 
alternative available to same-sex couples, fairness dictates that these rights be extended equally 
to opposite-sex, unmarried couples.”); Lynd, supra note 64, at 566 (concluding that domestic 
partnership programs limited to only same-sex couples discriminate on the basis of sex and 
violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
249 See, e.g., Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ., 251 F.3d 604, 610–11 (7th Cir. 2001) (Posner, J.) 
(holding that it is not a violation of equal protection for a public employer to provide benefits 
only to same-sex domestic partners); Partners Healthcare Sys., Inc. v. Sullivan, 497 F. Supp. 2d 
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recommended that domestic partnership programs be limited only to 
opposite-sex couples.250 Furthermore, the theory behind marriage 
alternatives has had a significant impact on the real world. While 
many public employers have chosen to limit their domestic 
partnership programs to same-sex couples, none offer domestic 
partnership benefits exclusively to opposite-sex couples. 
At the federal level, there is no movement to provide domestic 
partnership rights to unmarried, opposite-sex couples. Instead, almost 
all federal action on this issue has been focused on same-sex couples. 
For example, on April 15, 2010, President Barack Obama directed the 
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate new rules 
concerning hospital visitation and medical decision-making rights.251 
The new rules, which went into effect on January 18, 2011,252 require 
all hospitals that receive Medicare and Medicaid funding to allow 
patients to choose their visitors and to follow patients’ advance 
directives, such as durable powers of attorney and health care 
proxies.253 Although the new rules affect both gay and straight 
                                                                                                                 
 
42, 45–46 (D. Mass. 2007) (holding that an employer’s decision to provide domestic 
partnerships benefits only to same-sex couples did not violate Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964). But see Ayyoub v. City of Oakland, No. 99-02937, at 4 (Cal. State Labor Comm’r 
Oct. 27, 1997) (finding that the City of Oakland impermissibly engaged in sexual orientation 
discrimination in limiting its domestic partnership benefits program only to same-sex couples), 
available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/9170076/Ayyoub-v-City-of-Oakland. Ayyoub is the 
only case to find impermissible discrimination in a domestic partnership benefits program 
reserved for same-sex couples. As Ayyoub was an administrative decision, and, therefore, not 
reviewed by any court, it is not binding law. Ayyoub is persuasive authority, however. See Lynd, 
supra note 64, at 583–89 (describing Ayyoub and its significance). 
250 There are, however, commentators who argue that domestic partnerships should not be 
offered at all. See, e.g., Lynne Marie Kohm, How Will the Proliferation and Recognition of 
Domestic Partnerships Affect Marriage?, 4 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 105, 110 (2002) (arguing that 
domestic partnerships dilute the value of marriage, particularly because they attempt to elevate 
same-sex partnerships); Lynn D. Wardle, Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American 
Law Institute’s ‘Domestic Partners’ Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1222–27 (2001) 
(arguing that domestic partnerships would devalue marriage because it would simultaneously 
inspire same-sex couples to marry and encourage opposite-sex couples to forgo marriage). 
According to Terry Kogan, the belief that domestic partnerships should be abolished is 
inherently antihomosexual as it demonizes gays and lesbians and argues that same-sex 
relationships lack all societal value. Kogan, supra note 248, at 1036–43.  
251 Memorandum from President Barack Obama to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services, 3 C.F.R. § 20511 (2010); Michael D. Shear, Visiting Rights Given to Gays, WASH. 
POST, Apr. 16, 2010, at A1; Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Obama Alters Hospital Rules for Gay Rights, 
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2010, at A1. 
252 Brian Bond, Hospital Visitation Regulations Go Into Effect Today, WHITE HOUSE 
OFFICE OF PUBLIC ENGAGEMENT BLOG, (Jan. 18, 2011, 5:41 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/ 
blog/2011/01/18/hospital-visitation-regulations-go-effect-today. 
253 3 C.F.R. § 20511. 
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couples, the change occurred because hospitals were routinely 
denying gays and lesbians access to their partners.  
Moreover, President Obama’s inspiration for the change was a 
lesbian couple—Janice Langbehn and Lisa Pond. While vacationing 
with their children in Florida in 2007, Pond suffered a brain 
aneurysm.254 Even though Pond and Langbehn had been partners for 
eighteen years and had executed advanced directives and medical 
powers of attorney for each other, the hospital refused to let 
Langbehn visit Pond or make medical decisions on her behalf.255 The 
hospital kept Langbehn in the waiting room for eight hours and let 
Langbhen see Pond only for five minutes while a priest administered 
last rights.256 When Pond died, Langbehnn was not allowed to be at 
her side.257 President Obama called Langhben from Air Force One on 
the day he ordered the new hospital rules.258 
Additionally, federal domestic partnership benefits—to the extent 
that they exist—are limited to federal employees in same-sex 
relationships. On June 17, 2009, President Obama signed a 
presidential memorandum granting long-term-care insurance and sick 
leave to the same-sex partners of federal employees.259 Although the 
1996 Defense of Marriage Act prevents health insurance from being 
offered to the same-sex partners of federal employees, legislators 
have introduced bills in the House and Senate to overturn this 
prohibition. In 2009, Representative Tammy Baldwin, the first openly 
lesbian U.S. Representative,260 and Senator Joseph Lieberman 
sponsored the Domestic Partnership Benefits and Obligations Act, 
which would provide health insurance and other benefits to the same-
sex partners of federal employees.261 President Barack Obama hailed 
this act as a necessary step towards equality for federal LGBT 
employees.262 There has been no discussion of providing these 
benefits to federal employees in opposite-sex relationships.  
                                                                                                                 





258 Shear, supra note 251. 
259 Steve Vogel, Gay Couples Express Hope Over Benefits Extension, WASH. POST, June 
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At the state level, there has been a consistent trend establishing 
that “marriage alternatives” are designed for LGBT couples: once a 
state adopts same-sex marriage, the state abolishes its “marriage 
alternative” programs.263 For example, Vermont, Connecticut, and 
New Hampshire started offering civil unions to its LGBT couples in 
2000, 2005, and 2007, respectively.264 Same-sex marriage became 
legal in these states in 2008 and 2009.265 By the end of 2009, all three 
of these states had passed legislation abolishing their civil union 
programs.266 On October 1, 2010, all existing civil unions in 
Connecticut automatically converted into marriages.267 On January 1, 
2011, all New Hampshire civil unions converted into marriages as 
well.268  
Similarly, in states where same-sex marriage is illegal, but where 
statewide “marriage alternative” programs still exist, it is clear that 
the purpose of these programs is to benefit and legitimize same-sex 
couples. For example, in Wisconsin and Oregon, only same-sex 
couples may enter into domestic partnerships.269 In Washington, all 
same-sex couples may join the state’s domestic partnership program; 
however, Washington allows opposite-sex couples into its domestic 
partnership program only when at least one partner is over sixty-two 
years old.270 Additionally, both Oregon’s and Washington’s domestic 
partnership statutes explicitly acknowledge that same-sex couples 
face discrimination in the United States.271 
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265 See supra note 56. 
266 See 2009 Vt. Adv. Legis Serv. 3 (repealing title 18, section 5160 of the Vermont 
Statutes Annotated, which allowed the state to conduct civil unions); 2009 Conn. Acts 09-13, 
§ 21 (repealing Connecticut’s civil union statute effective October 1, 2010); 2009 N.H. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. Adv. Legis Serv. 59 (LexisNexis 2009) (ending New Hampshire’s civil union 
program on January 1, 2010). 
267 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-38rr (West Supp. 2010) (stating that all Connecticut 
civil unions will merge into marriages on October 1, 2010). 
268 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:46 (2010) (“Any civil union shall be dissolved by 
operation of law by any marriage of the same parties to each other . . . .”). 
269 WIS. STAT. § 700.01 (2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.305 (2009). 
270 WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26-60-010. 
271 Washington’s domestic partnership law states:  
The legislature finds that same sex couples, because they cannot marry in this 
state, do not automatically have the same access that married couples have to certain 
 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
1356 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
In California, all same-sex couples may join the state’s domestic 
partnership registry. Opposite-sex couples may also join California’s 
registry, but at least one partner must be sixty-two years old or 
older.272 When California first began offering domestic partnerships 
in 1999, partnership benefits were limited mainly to hospital 
visitation and medical-decision rights.273 As a direct result of 
significant LGBT-rights lobbying, California now offers its domestic 
partnership registrants almost full marital rights. For example, 
domestic partners in California did not have the right to inherit 
intestate until 2003.274 The law changed after public outcry following 
the death of Jeff Collman, a flight attendant on American Airlines 
Flight 11, which crashed into the World Trade Center on September 
11, 2001.275 Because Collman had not executed a will, Keith 
Bradkowski, Collman’s partner for eleven years, was unable to inherit 
                                                                                                                 
 
rights and benefits, such as those associated with hospital visitation, health care 
decision-making, organ donation decisions, and other issues related to illness, 
incapacity, and death. Although many of these rights and benefits may be secured by 
private agreement, doing so often is costly and complex. 
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OR. REV. STAT. § 106.305(3) (2009). 
272 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2011) (outlining California’s domestic 
partnership program). Originally, California refused to allow opposite-sex couples into the 
domestic partnership registry unless both partners were at least sixty-two years old. See Assemb. 
B. 26, 1999–2000 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 1999) (chaptered and approved by the governor on Oct. 
2, 1999). See also Megan E. Callan, Comment, The More, the Not Marry-Er: In Search of a 
Policy Behind Eligibility for California Domestic Partnerships, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 427, 
430–31 (2003) (discussing the eligibility requirements of California’s earlier domestic 
partnership laws). 
273 Assemb. B. 26, supra note 272. 
274 Assemb. B. 2216, 2001–02 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2002) (codified as amended at CAL. 
PROB. CODE §§ 6401–6402 (West Supp. 2003) (effective July 1, 2003)); see also Callan, supra 
note 272, at 433–34 (discussing the history behind California’s domestic partners receiving the 
right to inherit intestate). 
275 See Gay Partner of 9/11 Victim and Lambda Legal Lawyer to Attend Signing of Bill 
Providing Inheritance Rights to Domestic Partners, LAMBDA LEGAL (Sept. 10, 2002), http:// 
www.lambdalegal.org/news/pr/ca_20020910_gay-partner-of-911-victim-lambda-lawyer-attend-
signing.html. 
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from Collman’s estate, even though both men had joined California’s 
registry.276 Bradkowski not only attended the signing of Assembly 
Bill 2216, which added intestacy to California’s Domestic Partnership 
Act, but served as the principal witness for the California Assembly 
and Senate during the bill’s debate.277 
Similarly, New Jersey’s “marriage alternative” programs were also 
designed mainly to benefit same-sex couples. From 2004 to 2007, 
New Jersey operated a two-tiered domestic partnership program. 
Under this program, all same-sex couples could register as domestic 
partners; opposite-sex couples could also join, but both partners had 
to be over sixty-two years old.278 Same-sex domestic partners also 
enjoyed more rights under New Jersey’s two-tiered program because 
they were prohibited from marrying.279 Additionally, an 
overwhelming majority of New Jersey’s registered domestic 
partnerships were between same-sex couples. In 2004, New Jersey 
registered 2,826 domestic partnerships: 98.4% of which were for 
same-sex couples.280 In 2005, New Jersey registered 1,059 domestic 
partnerships: 96% were between couples in same-sex relationships.281  
In 2007, New Jersey created civil unions, which are offered 
exclusively to same-sex couples and provide them with almost full 
marital rights.282 Although New Jersey did not abolish its more 
limited domestic partnership program, it significantly tightened the 
program’s eligibility requirements. Regardless of sexual orientation, 
only couples where both partners are older than sixty-two may now 
enter into a domestic partnership in New Jersey. Today, young and 
middle-aged same-sex couples are forbidden from becoming domestic 
partners or receiving marriage licenses; instead, they may only form 
civil unions.283 
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Finally, it is clear that marriage alternatives are designed primarily 
for same-sex couples, even in states that do not impose age or gender 
restrictions on domestic partners. For example, Nevada’s domestic 
partnership law, which does not reference sexual orientation or 
gender, was sponsored by openly gay state senator David Parks.284 
Further, both the opponents and supporters of Nevada’s domestic 
partnership law categorized it as a gay rights issue.285 Similarly, 
Colorado’s designated beneficiary program, which also does not 
reference sexual orientation or gender, was introduced in the 
Colorado House and Senate by openly gay legislators (Colorado 
House Representative Jennifer Veiga and Colorado Senator Mark 
Ferrandino) and considered primarily as gay rights legislation.286  
Additionally, both gay rights advocates and opponents recognize 
that Rhode Island’s recent decision to grant domestic partners funeral 
arrangement rights was sparked by the story of Mark Goldberg.287 On 
October 2, 2008, Ron Hanby, Goldberg’s partner of seventeen years, 
committed suicide.288 The State of Rhode Island, however, refused to 
recognize Goldberg as “next of kin” or give him Hanby’s remains, 
even though the two men had married in Connecticut and had 
executed testamentary documents for each other’s benefit, including 
powers of attorney, wills, and living wills.289 Because of Rhode Island 
law, Goldberg could not even place Hanby’s obituary in the local 
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http://m.rockymountainnews.com/news/2009/feb/21/gay-rights-beneficiary-bill-advances-in-
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287 See Katherine Gregg, R.I. Lawmakers Override Governor’s Vetoes, PROVIDENCE 
JOURNAL (Jan. 5, 2010, 5:05 PM), http://newsblog.projo.com/2010/01/lawmakers-over-ride-
governors.html. Both pro- and antigay rights groups agree that the impetus for granting funeral 
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newspaper.290 Rhode Island did not give Goldberg his husband’s body 
until over a month after his death, on November 6, 2008.291  
Public outcry resulted in a bill expanding funeral and burial rights 
to domestic partners. When former-Governor Carcieri vetoed the 
legislation, he said it was because the domestic partnership law 
represented “the incremental erosion of the principles surrounding 
traditional marriage.”292 The Rhode Island legislature overrode the 
governor’s veto on January 5, 2010.293 
2. The Purpose Behind Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Programs 
Just like all other domestic partnership programs in the United 
States, Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and benefits programs 
are designed primarily to benefit same-sex couples who may not 
marry. Although all three registries are open to same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples, they were intended to provide local, symbolic 
recognition to same-sex couples.  
The City of Cleveland Heights’ domestic partnership registry was 
the result of a citizen initiative orchestrated by Heights Families for 
Equality, which describes itself as a “coalition of gay and non-gay 
voters working to promote access to basic rights for all.”294 When 
Cleveland Heights City Hall passed the domestic partner registry 
ordinance, Council Member Nancy Dietrich likewise declared the 
registry to be “an expression of the justice and equal treatment, for 
all . . . .”295  
Similarly, Toledo City Councilman Joe McNamara, who 
sponsored Toledo’s domestic partnership registry, intended the 
registry to portray Toledo as a tolerant, diverse, and progressive city 
for businesses and same-sex families.296 When former Toledo City 
Councilman Rob Ludeman voted against the registry, he claimed that 
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it was just an “attempt to tear down the institution of marriage 
between a man and a woman.”297  
Finally, Cleveland City Councilman Joe Cimperman, a longtime 
ally of Cleveland’s LGBT community, sponsored Cleveland’s 
domestic partner registry,298 which he openly hailed as a step towards 
LGBT equality and proof of Cleveland’s commitment to its gay and 
lesbian citizens.299 Furthermore, the Gay Games chose Cleveland as 
its 2014 host city in part because of its domestic partnership 
registry.300 
Ohio’s domestic partnership benefits programs are also primarily 
designed to benefit same-sex couples. In November 2004, when Ohio 
adopted the Marriage Amendment, five public institutions offered 
domestic partnership health benefits: the City of Cleveland Heights, 
Ohio University, Miami University, Cleveland State University, and 
Youngstown State University.301 At the time, all of these institutions 
reserved domestic partner health benefits exclusively for same-sex 
couples.302 Today there are 24 public institutions that offer domestic 
partnership health benefits.303 Ten of these institutions, representing 
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individuals of the same sex who share a regular and permanent residence . . . .”), with Policy & 
Procedure—40.013: Domestic Partner Benefits, OHIO U., http://www.ohio.edu/policy/40-
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303 See discussion supra Part V.D. 
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42% of all public employers that provide domestic partnership health 
insurance in Ohio, offer these benefits only to same-sex couples.304  
Of the fourteen institutions that offer domestic partnership health 
benefits to gay and straight employees, three of them—Central State 
University, NEOUCOM, and Oberlin City Schools—have only same-
sex couples receiving benefits.305 Additionally, both The Ohio State 
University and Central Ohio Technical College make it easier for 
same-sex couples to receive domestic partnership benefits and offer 
these couples better benefits than their opposite-sex counterparts.306 
Finally, although Ohio University now allows both same-sex and 
opposite-sex couples to receive domestic partnership health 
insurance, the program was originally limited to same-sex couples as 
a “matter of equity and fairness.”307 The program, which started in 
2004, has been open to opposite-sex couples since only June 2009.308 
Therefore, at 16 of the 24 (67%) Ohio institutions that offer domestic 
partnership health insurance, same-sex couples have either a currently 
or historically preferred status. 
There is also strong evidence that the domestic partnership 
programs at Ohio’s remaining eight institutions were designed 
primarily for same-sex couples. According to the American 
Association of University Professors (AAUP) University of 
Cincinnati Chapter, the only reason the organization bargained for 
domestic partnership benefits was to stop the university from 
discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.309 Likewise, the 
AAUP Wright State University Chapter fought for domestic 
partnership benefits on behalf of LGBT faculty.310  
Although other institutions may not be so forthright in describing 
the purpose behind their domestic partnership policies, the desire to 
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help same-sex couples is still present, couched in the rhetoric of 
“fairness” and “equality.” For example, at Kent State University, the 
purpose of the domestic partnership program is euphemistically 
described as a way to show an “appreciation and high regard for 
diversity.”311 Similarly, Franklin County’s domestic partnership 
benefits program was created to reflect the “diversity” of Franklin 
County’s workforce312 and to achieve the goals of “fairness” and 
“integrity.”313 Even the City of Columbus, the most recent public 
employer to offer domestic partnership benefits, acknowledges that 
the program is predicated upon the concepts of “fairness” and 
“equality.”314 
3. Conclusion 
Domestic partnership programs in Ohio and across the United 
States are innately designed to protect and benefit same-sex couples, 
and not just the “unmarried.” Allowing opposite-sex couples access to 
“marriage alternatives” does not change this reality. Further, it is 
impossible to divorce domestic partnership programs from the LGBT 
rights movement. While there are many domestic partnership 
programs in the United States reserved exclusively for same-sex 
couples, there is not a single public domestic partnership program in 
the country open only to unmarried, opposite-sex couples. Therefore, 
attacks against Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and benefits 
programs intentionally and maliciously target same-sex couples. 
Because the history of marriage alternatives shows that attacks on 
domestic partnerships must necessarily be targeted attacks against 
gays and lesbians, Feeney’s second prong is satisfied and the second 
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment violates the equal 
protection. 
                                                                                                                 
311 Research & Faculty Diversity—Benefits of Working at KSU, KENT STATE U., 
http://www.kent.edu/ehhs/rfd/diversity/benefits-of-working-at-ksu.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 
2010). 
312 See Franklin County Board of Commissioners Minutes of General Session, FRANKLIN 
COUNTY, 9 (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.co.franklin.oh.us/commissioners/board/documents/ 
August18GSminutes.pdf (Comments by Franklin County Human Resources Director Maggie 
Snow stating that the new employee handbook, which includes domestic partner benefits, 
helps to reflect the diversity of Franklin County’s workforce). 
313 Barbara Carmen, Commissioners Approve Domestic Partner Benefits, COLUMBUS 
DISPATCH (Aug. 18, 2009), http://www.dispatch.com/live/content/local_news/stories/2009/08/ 
18/fcpartners.html?sid=101. 
314 Caruso, supra note 201. 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
2011] WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY 1363 
B. The Proponents of the Ohio Marriage Amendment Bear  
Animus Towards Same-Sex Couples and Intentionally  
Misled Voters About the Amendment’s Scope 
This section looks at what the sponsors of the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment advertised during the Issue 1 campaign and establishes 
that the second sentence of the Amendment intentionally targets 
same-sex couples, thereby meeting Feeney’s second prong.  
First, this section establishes that ballot initiatives are vulnerable to 
manipulation and misinformation, particularly when those initiatives 
concern minority civil rights. Second, this section shows that Citizens 
for Community Values (“CCV”), which ran the Ohio Campaign to 
Protect Marriage (“OCPM”), bears a significant amount of animosity 
towards gays and lesbians. Furthermore, CCV’s animus is identical to 
the hate Colorado for Family Values (“CFV”) displayed during its 
campaign for Amendment 2, which the Supreme Court overturned in 
Romer v. Evans.315 Finally, this section shows that CCV always 
intended for the Ohio Marriage Amendment to prohibit all forms of 
recognition for same-sex couples, no matter how innocuous, and that 
they lied to or misled voters on this critical issue. This conclusion, 
which is based upon CCV’s misleading statements, obfuscating 
tactics, and animus towards gays and lesbians, establishes that the 
Ohio Marriage Amendment was designed to specifically target same-
sex couples, and not just the “unmarried,” in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
1. The Inherent Vulnerabilities of Ballot Initiatives 
Ballot initiatives, particularly when they concern the rights of 
minorities, are inherently vulnerable to proponent abuse and 
manipulation. Ballot initiatives are a form of direct democracy in 
which private citizens “propose a law or constitutional amendment, 
place it on the ballot, and vote to adopt it into law, all without aid or 
interference by their legislature.”316 Although the Populist Movement 
adopted ballot initiatives at the turn of the twentieth century, the 
Founding Fathers explicitly rejected direct democracy and saw it as a 
facilitator of tyranny. 
The Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution states: 
“The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
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Republican Form of Government.”317 The Constitution promises the 
states a republic, not a direct democracy.318 Furthermore, the 
Founding Fathers made this choice because they feared that pure 
democracy would lead to mob rule. Indeed, the Founding Fathers put 
many provisions in the Constitution specifically to prevent direct 
democracy. For example, the Founding Fathers established the 
Electoral College, thereby preventing the people from directly voting 
for the President;319 originally required state legislatures, and not the 
people, to elect senators;320 and prohibited the people from directly 
amending the U.S. Constitution, leaving the amendment process to 
Congress, state legislatures, and conventions.321 
Moreover many of the Founders detailed the evils of democracy 
and the inherent value of republics in their writings.322 According to 
James Madison, one of the fathers of the Constitution, direct 
democracy was an unstable form of government and a palpable threat 
to minority rights.323 Furthermore, Madison believed that one of the 
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323 In The Federalist Papers, Madison stated: 
[A] pure Democracy, by which I mean, a Society, consisting of a small number 
of citizens, who assemble and administer the Government in person, can admit of no 
cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or interest will, in almost every 
case, be felt by a majority of the whole; a communication and concert results from 
the form of Government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to 
sacrifice the weaker party, or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is, that such 
Democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and contention; have ever been 
found incompatible with personal security, or the rights of property; and have in 
general been as short in their lives, as they have been violent in their deaths. . . .  
A Republic, by which I mean a Government in which the scheme of 
representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises the cure for 
which we are seeking. 
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greatest strengths of republicanism, which he defined as “the total 
exclusion of the people in their collective capacity,”324 was its ability 
to protect minority rights: 
It is of great importance in a republic, not only to guard the 
society against the oppression of its rulers; but to guard one 
part of the society against the injustice of the other part. 
Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of 
citizens. If a majority be united by a common interest, the 
rights of the minority will be insecure.325 
Other Founding Fathers, such as Federalists Alexander Hamilton and 
John Adams, also feared that direct democracy would result in 
tyranny. In a scathing commentary on the history of pure 
democracies, Hamilton noted, “[t]he ancient democracies, in which 
the people themselves deliberated, never possessed one feature of 
good government. Their very character was tyranny; their figure 
deformity. When they assembled, the field of debate presented an 
ungovernable mob.”326 According to Adams, the “simplicity of . . . a 
pure democracy will always have its charm with minds not kept 
awake to its susceptibility of abuse.”327  
Even the Anti-Federalists, the Founding Fathers who were more 
supportive of direct democracy, realized that it should not be applied 
at the state or federal level. As stated in the Brutus Essays, which 
contain some of the Founding Era’s most forceful Anti-Federalist 
arguments: 
In a pure democracy the people are the sovereign, and their 
will is declared by themselves; for this purpose they must all 
come together to deliberate, and decide. This kind of 
government cannot be exercised, therefore, over a country of 
any considerable extent; it must be confined to a single city, 
or at least limited to such bounds as that the people can 
conveniently assemble, be able to debate, understand the 
                                                                                                                 
 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 46 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, Inc., 1992). 
324 THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 322 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, Inc., 1992) 
(emphasis omitted). 
325 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 264 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books, Inc., 1992). 
326 Abrams, supra note 322, at 1032 (quoting Alexander Hamilton, Convention of New 
York: Speech on the Compromises of the Constitution (1788), in 2 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 440 (John C. Hamilton ed., 1850)). 
327 Id. at 1033 (quoting John Adams, Illness in Europe—Commercial Treaties—Mission to 
the Court of Great Britain, in 1 THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 400, 428 (1856)). 
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subject submitted to them, and declare their opinion 
concerning it.328  
Therefore, while ballot initiatives are currently fashionable—more 
state ballot initiatives have taken place since the 1990s than ever 
before in U.S. history329—the Founding Fathers abhorred direct 
democracy on a large scale and diligently worked to protect the 
United States from an institution that they believed threatened 
minority rights.330 
The modern ballot initiatives process proves that the Founding 
Fathers were right to be afraid. Although originally created as a way 
to better serve the will of the people, modern ballot initiatives often 
represent little more than the purist agendas of special interest groups.  
According to political scientist Richard J. Ellis, modern ballot 
initiatives suffer from voter drop-off, where voters show up at the 
polls, but then fail to vote on ballot initiatives, as well as “congested 
ballots and confused voters, deceptive titles and multiple subjects, 
paid signature gatherers, rich individuals bankrolling pet initiatives, 
and the pervasive influence of organized special interest groups.”331 
To support Ellis’s conclusion, one need only look at the extralegal 
ballot initiative process.  
By their very nature ballot initiatives operate outside of the 
traditional system of checks and balances—a much-lauded hallmark 
of representative democracy. Special interest groups get to draft their 
ballot initiatives in secret. Once the measure’s petition gets enough 
signatures in an ill-policed signature-gathering process,332 the 
initiative is placed on the ballot. If more than 50% of the people who 
vote on that one specific issue vote in favor of the initiative, then it 
                                                                                                                 
328 BRUTUS NO. 1 (Oct. 18, 1787), in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 363, 369 
(Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). 
329 See Gildersleeve, supra note 121, at 1443. 
330 Additionally, for the reasons set forth above, there are many scholars who argue that 
ballot initiatives violate the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution. See, e.g., Erwin 
Chemerinsky, Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293, 301–04 (arguing 
that direct democracy violates the Guarantee Clause); Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct 
Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1539–45 (1990) (finding direct democracy constitutionally 
suspect and arguing that ballot initiatives should be subject to higher judicial scrutiny). But see 
Pac. States Tel. & Tel. Co v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (upholding a tax measure enacted via 
ballot initiative). 
331 RICHARD J. ELLIS, DEMOCRATIC DELUSIONS: THE INITIATIVE PROCESS IN AMERICA 
192 (2002). 
332 See ANTI-GAY RIGHTS: ASSESSING VOTER INITIATIVES 3–4 (Stephanie L. Witt & 
Suzanne McCorkle eds., 1997) (“There are now consultants and corporations that virtually 
guarantee, for a price, that they can get your initiative on the ballot. . . . The experts for hire and 
the presence of relatively low signature thresholds in most states have contributed to the 
explosion in the number of initiatives put before voters in recent elections.”). 
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becomes law. There is no requirement that 50% of the people who 
show up to vote approve of or understand the measure.333 
Furthermore, at no point in the life of a ballot initiative is there 
legislative or executive review.334 During the drafting process, 
deliberation, debate, and compromise across party lines are all 
notably absent. Elected legislators, professionals who are presumably 
more aware of the nuances and consequences of words, have no input 
in a potential law. Instead partisan citizens get to write and advertise 
almost whatever they want, and they may decide that “confusion, 
rather than clarity, better serves their interests.”335 According to one 
scholar of direct democracy, ballot initiatives “are not drafted in a 
way that inspires confidence in their care for and attentiveness to the 
problems they address. Written in secret by those who share a 
                                                                                                                 
333 According to scholar David B. Magleby, voter drop-off is a common problem. Magleby 
estimates that about 15–18% of those who show up at the polls fail to vote on ballot initiatives, 
and that voters are nearly twice as likely to drop-off on ballot propositions than on candidates. 
DAVID B. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED 
STATES 100, 106 (1984) [hereinafter MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION]. Moreover, those who 
drop-off tend to come from lower economic backgrounds, have lower education, and are racial 
minorities, thereby making ballot initiatives unrepresentative of the total population. Id. at 103–
05. Additionally, the role of voter drop-off can have a significant impact in an election. For 
example, one statewide initiative relating to civil service reform passed “despite getting the 
votes of fewer than 15 percent of those who showed up at the polls.” ELLIS, supra note 331, at 
128. 
Voter confusion—even at the most elemental levels—is also a significant problem. Unlike 
candidate races where voters cast their votes for specific politicians, ballot initiatives require 
people to vote “yes” or “no,” and voters often confused as to what “yes” or “no” votes actually 
mean. For example, in an analysis of a 1980 rent control initiative in California, “[o]ver three-
fourths of California voters did not match their views on rent control with their vote on the 
proposition: twenty-three percent wanted to protect rent control but incorrectly voted ‘yes,’ and 
fifty-four percent were opposed to rent control but incorrectly voted ‘no.’” David B. Magleby, 
Let the Voters Decide?: An Assessment of the Initiative and Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. 
L. REV. 13, 39 (1995) [hereinafter Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?].  
As an illustration of how unrepresentative ballot initiatives can be, suppose that there is a 
state of exactly 100 people, and that there is an election with a ballot initiative section. Only 63 
people show up at the polls. See Voter Turnout Increases by 5 Million in 2008 Presidential 
Election, U.S. Census Bureau Reports, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 20, 2009), http://www. 
census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/voting/cb09-110.html (finding that only 63% of eligible 
voters in the West, Northeast, and South voted in the 2008 Presidential election). Taking 
Professor Magleby’s 15% voter drop-off analysis into account, there are now only 53 people 
voting on the ballot initiative section. See MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra, at 100. Thus, 
a ballot initiative will be enacted depending on the cumulative “yes” or “no” votes of 27 people 
in a state of 100. If the voter confusion rates are the same as in 1980 rent control study, 
however, Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra, at 39, then 39 of the 53 people who voted on 
the ballot initiative section would have accidentally voted for the wrong side.  
334 See Abrams, supra note 322, at 1035–36 (discussing the lack of executive or legislative 
review in the ballot initiative process). 
335 Id. at 1035. 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
1368 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
common view of societal problems, ballot propositions eschew 
compromise and tend toward extremism with appalling frequency.”336  
Once the initiative is adopted, the executive branch has no 
authority to review, accept, or veto the law. Moreover, initiative 
proponents cannot be held politically accountable for their policies 
and agendas. Unlike members of the legislature, executive, or even 
judiciary, the private citizens who sponsor discriminatory ballot 
initiatives do not fear being voted out of office. Thus, while “judicial 
review serves as the last level of scrutiny” in representative 
democracy, it “provides the only substantive check on the enactment 
of discriminatory laws through direct legislation.”337 Also, when 
ballot initiatives are aimed at limiting minority civil rights they enjoy 
far greater success than other types of initiatives or referenda.338 As 
such, ballot initiatives are an exceptionally attractive way for antigay 
interest groups to push through agendas that would otherwise not pass 
in a representative democracy. 
Finally, because ballot initiatives are not subject to executive or 
legislative review, initiative proponents enjoy almost complete 
control over drafting and advertising their measures. This lack of 
oversight often leads to voter manipulation and confusion.  
Initiative proponents are free to prey upon voters’ sensibilities by 
giving their initiatives intentionally misleading and emotionally 
charged titles. For example, the Ku Klux Klan sponsored the 
“Compulsory Education Bill” in Oregon in 1922, which required all 
                                                                                                                 
336 James M. Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of Direct Democracy to State 
Constitutional Jurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 66 (1983). 
337 Abrams, supra note 322, at 1054. 
338 According to Professor Magleby, in a study of statewide ballot initiatives from 1898–
1992, ballot initiatives average a 38.1% passage rate. See Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, 
supra note 333, at 26. According to Barbara Gamble, in a study of civil rights ballot initiatives 
between 1959–1993, however, 78% all ballot initiatives affecting civil rights resulted in the 
defeat of minority interests. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. 
J. POL. SCI. 245, 254 (1997), cited in William E. Adams, Jr., Is it Animus or a Difference of 
Opinion? The Problems Caused by the Invidious Intent of Anti-Gay Ballot Measures, 34 
WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 449, 463 (1998) [hereinafter Adams, Jr., Animus]. Moreover, when the 
studied ballot initiatives addressed sexual orientation, 79% of these measures ended in the 
limitation of LGBT rights. Gamble, supra, at 258, cited in Adams, Jr., Animus, supra, at 463. 
Political scientists Donald P. Haider-Markel and Kenneth J. Meier also found similar results in 
their study of ballot initiatives concerning gay rights. 
From 1972 to 2001, at least 122 cities, counties, and states held initiatives and referenda 
that in some way addressed the civil rights of lesbians and gays. Of these measures, 90 were 
antigay in their intent, mostly repealing existing laws or banning the passage of gay civil rights 
laws in the future. Over 71% of these initiatives and referenda have resulted in losses for 
supporters of lesbian and gay civil rights. Only 32 initiatives sought to enact laws to ensure the 
civil rights of lesbians and gays; almost 69% of these have failed. Donald P. Haider-Markel & 
Kenneth J. Meier, Legislative Victory, Electoral Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the 
Battles over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights, 20 REV. POL’Y RES. 671, 676 (2003). 
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school-aged children to attend public schools.339 At the time, 
however, Oregon already required children between the ages of nine 
and fifteen to attend school, but gave them the option of receiving a 
public or private education.340 Belied by its name, the Compulsory 
Education Bill’s true purpose was to force the closing of Oregon’s 
private Catholic schools. The Compulsory Education Bill passed with 
52.7% of the vote341 and remained law until 1925, when the Supreme 
Court struck it down in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.342 Similarly, in 
2010, Oklahoma voters approved a ballot initiative prohibiting state 
courts from using or considering Sharia law.343 To date, however, no 
Oklahoma court has ever cited to Islamic law in its decisions.344 The 
ballot initiative, which was passed by 70% of voters, was titled the 
“Save Our State Amendment.”345 
Proponents may also draft radical or discriminatory initiatives, but 
hide their true intent in a mass of facially neutral and ambiguous 
phrases. For example, in Reitman v. Mulkey346 the Supreme Court 
struck down California’s Proposition 14,347 a statewide ballot 
initiative that had amended California’s constitution.348 Proposition 
14 did not mention the words “race,” “religion,” “ethnicity,” or 
“discrimination” in its text, but the initiative’s immediate and 
intentional effects were clear.349 Once passed, Proposition 14 
overturned California’s fair housing laws and enshrined a 
constitutional right to engage in private housing discrimination.350  
Similarly, in 1994, the Florida Supreme Court struck down a ballot 
initiative that would have prohibited the State of Florida from 
granting antidiscrimination protection to gays and lesbians.351 
                                                                                                                 
339 See Abrams, supra note 322, at 1041–50 (discussing the history of the Compulsory 
Education Bill). 
340 Id. at 1042. 
341 Id. at 1050. 
342 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
343 See Jess Bravin, Oklahoma Shariah Ban Halted, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2010, at A6. 
344 Id. 
345 Id. 
346 387 U.S. 369 (1967). 
347 Id. at 380–81. 
348 Id. at 370–71. 
349 Id. at 371. 
350 Id. at 380–81.  
351 The Florida Supreme Court removed the proposed initiative from the Florida ballot in 
In re Advisory Op. to the Att’y Gen.—Restricts Laws Related to Discrimination, 632 So.2d 1018 
(Fla. 1994). The court held that the initiative was unconstitutional because it failed the Florida 
Constitution’s “single-subject requirement.” Id. at 1020. The court also held that the initiative 
was unconstitutional because the proponent’s description of the measure did not adequately 
warn voters about the initiative’s potential consequences. Id. Notably absent from the court’s 
decision was whether the proposed measure and the proponent’s description of the measure 
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However, the authors of the proposed amendment did not include the 
words “gay,” “lesbian,” “bisexual,” “homosexual,” or “sexual 
orientation” in the initiative’s text.352 Instead, for admittedly legal and 
political reasons,353 the initiative’s proponents drafted a law that 
would have prohibited Florida and its political subdivisions from 
extending antidiscrimination protections to anyone except on the 
basis of “race, color, religion, sex, national origin, age, handicap, 
ethnic background, marital status or familial status.”354 Although this 
laundry list of “acceptable” classes made the Florida initiative facially 
neutral, its target was abundantly clear. To obtain a copy of the 
initiative’s petition, one first had to call 1-800-GAY-LAWS.355 
In addition to intentionally drafting confusing and ambiguous 
laws, initiative proponents often use deceptive advertising to mislead 
voters about an initiative’s legal scope. As a direct result of voters’ 
inability to understand the impact of ambiguous ballot initiatives, the 
role of advertising, which guides voters’ beliefs about an initiative’s 
scope, is exceptionally important. According to scholar Jane S. 
Schacter: 
Ballot propositions are presented to voters largely in a legal 
vacuum, unconnected in any specific way to the surrounding 
legal context. Because of this lack of context, many of the 
interpretive issues that confront courts are outside the 
plausible realm of voter contemplation. A vote in favor of a 
ballot question will signify, at best, an electoral judgment on 
the salient and general policies in question, not on the rarefied 
points that often generate interpretive litigation.356 
In a 1984 study once called “the broadest and most extensive 
empirical analysis of direct democracy,”357 political scientist David 
Magleby analyzed how modern voters learn about the content of 
                                                                                                                 
 
“were affirmatively misleading because they failed to inform the voters of the measure’s central 
purpose—to restrict the rights of lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals.” William E. Adams, Jr., Pre-
Election Anti-Gay Ballot Initiative Challenges: Issues of Electoral Fairness, Majoritarian 
Tyranny, and Direct Democracy, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 583, 618 (1994) [hereinafter Adams, Jr., 
Challenges]. 
352 See Adams, Jr., Challenges, supra note 351, at 589–90 (discussing Florida’s antigay 
“stealth proposal”). 
353 See id. at 590 n.19 and accompanying text. 
354 Id. at 589 n.18. 
355 Id. at 590 n.20. 
356 Jane S. Schacter, The Pursuit of “Popular Intent”: Interpretive Dilemmas in Direct 
Democracy, 105 YALE L.J. 107, 127 (1995).  
357 Id. at 131 n.93 (referring to MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 333). 
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ballot initiatives.358 He concluded that not only are the majority of 
voters unable to understand proposition texts, but that most 
proposition voters “have only heard about the measure from a single 
source, and . . . are ignorant about the measure except at the highly 
emotional level of the television advertising, the most prevalent 
source of information for those who have heard of the proposition 
before voting.”359 Furthermore, in later writings, Magleby declared 
that “[h]ow campaigns have defined issues before the voters is 
probably the most important explanation of voting behavior on ballot 
questions.”360 This argument is not only supported by other scholars 
and non-partisan governmental committees,361 but also by three 
separate state supreme courts.362  
                                                                                                                 
358 MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION, supra note 333, at 130–41. 
359 Id. at 198. 
360 Magleby, Let the Voters Decide?, supra note 333, at 38. As further proof of Magleby’s 
assertion, one need only look at recent events in El Paso, Texas. In 2009, the City of El Paso 
extended domestic partnership benefits to both gay and straight employees. Nineteen people 
signed up for the program. In response, local Pastor Tom Brown wrote a proposed ballot 
initiative that would require El Paso to endorse “traditional family values” by limiting health 
benefits only to “city employees and their legal spouse and dependent children.” With 
proponents advertising that the measure concerned only “traditional family values,” the 
initiative passed with 55% of the vote. See Ana Campoy, Same-Sex Benefits Ban Roils El Paso, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2010, at A4. 
Because of the initiative’s wording, however, the new law not only removed domestic 
partnership benefits, but also prohibited El Paso from providing health insurance to retired city 
workers. Id. According to the President of El Paso’s police union, the ordinance could deny 
health insurance to as many as 10,000 retirees. Id. 
A District Court judge recently granted a preliminary injunction against El Paso, noting 
that the ordinance most likely violates the U.S. Constitution’s Contract and Equal Protection 
Clauses. See Order Granting in Part Plaintiffs’ Application for a Preliminary Injunction at 18–
20, Martin v. City of El Paso, Case No.3:10-cv-00468-FM.  
361 See, e.g., CAL. COMM’N ON CAMPAIGN FIN., DEMOCRACY BY INITIATIVE: SHAPING 
CALIFORNIA’S FOURTH BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT 198 (1992) (finding that most voters get their 
information from the mass media and paid political advertising), quoted in Schacter, supra note 
356, at 131 (finding that most people get their ballot initiative information from thirty-to-sixty-
second TV spots); see also id. at 131 n.94 (listing various studies that also show that voters get 
most of their ballot initiative information from the media).  
362 In the early 20th century, the Montana, Arkansas, and Oregon Supreme Courts all noted 
that voters received their ballot initiative information from few sources, relied heavily on the 
media, and often based their vote on an initiative’s easily manipulated title. According to these 
three state supreme courts: 
The majority of qualified electors are so much interested in managing their own 
affairs that they have no time carefully to consider measures affecting the general 
public. A great number of voters undoubtedly have a superficial knowledge of 
proposed laws to be voted upon, which is derived from newspaper comments or from 
conversation with their associates. We think the assertion may safely be ventured 
that it is only the few persons who earnestly favor or zealously oppose the passage of 
a proposed law, initiated by petition, who have attentively studied its contents and 
know how it will probably affect their private interests. The greater number of voters 
do not possess this information and usually derive their knowledge of the contents of 
a proposed law from an inspection of the title thereof, which is sometimes secured 
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The campaign for Colorado’s Amendment 2 shows just how 
powerful false advertising can be in a ballot initiative campaign. In 
1993, 71% of Coloradans believed that it should be illegal to fire a 
person solely on the basis of his or her sexual orientation.363 In 
contrast, Robert K. Skolrood, one of the drafters of Colorado’s 
Amendment 2, specifically worded Amendment 2 to prevent gays and 
lesbians from having any cause of action for discrimination in 
“employment, education, housing, or status.”364 During their 
Amendment 2 campaign, CFV portrayed Amendment 2 as a 
necessary piece of legislation to stop deviant homosexuals from 
receiving “special rights.”365 Instead of saying that Amendment 2 
would overturn local antidiscrimination laws, CFV framed 
Amendment 2 as a law prohibiting gay affirmative action programs, 
even though no such programs existed in Colorado.366 On November 
3, 1992, 53% of Coloradans approved Amendment 2—thereby 
making it perfectly legal for employers to fire workers based upon 
their real or perceived sexual orientation.367  
Ballot initiatives suffer from significant vulnerabilities. They are 
prone to manipulation and dogmatism at all levels of the process. 
They circumvent the traditional checks and balances system and are 
subject only to judicial review. Even the Founding Fathers rejected 
ballot initiatives, regarding them as vehicles for majoritarian tyranny 
and palpable threats to minority rights. Overall, ballot initiatives 
represent an attractive alternative for special interest groups that wish 
to push through purist, anti-minority agendas that are not shared by 
the general population.  
                                                                                                                 
 
only from the very meager details afforded by a ballot which is examined in an 
election booth preparatory to exercising the right of suffrage. 
Sawyer Stores, Inc. v. Mitchell, 62 P.2d 342, 348–49 (Mont. 1936); Westbrook v. McDonald, 
43 S.W.2d 356, 360 (Ark. 1931); State ex rel. Gibson v. Richardson, 85 P. 225, 229 (Or. 1906). 
363 Sean Patrick O’Rourke & Laura K. Lee Dellinger, Romer v. Evans: The Centerpiece of 
the American Gay-Rights Debate, in ANTI-GAY RIGHTS, supra note 332, at 133, 136. 
364 Sharon E. Debbage Alexander, Romer v. Evans and the Amendment 2 Controversy: The 
Rhetoric and Reality of Sexual Orientation Discrimination in America, 6 TEX. F. ON C.L. & C.R. 
261, 286 (2002) (quoting Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 18, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996)). 
365 See id. at 277–80 (discussing the “special rights” arguments made by Amendment 2’s 
sponsors); William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: The Sedimentation of Antigay Discourse 
and the Channeling Effect of Judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1352–53 (2000) (stating 
that Amendment 2’s sponsors “emphasized that [Colorado’s] antidiscrimination ordinances not 
only gave assertedly overprivileged homosexuals ‘special rights’ but also invaded the rights and 
institutions of straight families”). 
366 Debbage Alexander, supra note 364, at 279. 
367 See O’Rourke & Dellinger, supra note 363, at 136. 
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This Note contends that CCV and the OCPM entered into and 
abused the ballot initiative process to unconstitutionally attack Ohio’s 
LGBT community. 
2. CCV Bears Unconstitutional Animus Against Gays and Lesbians 
In 2010, the Southern Poverty Law Center (“SPLC”), labeled 
eighteen organizations in the United States as antigay hate groups.368 
According to SPLC, an antigay hate group is defined as an 
organization that engages in the propagation of known falsehoods 
about gays and lesbians—i.e. makes “claims about LGBT people that 
have been thoroughly discredited by scientific authorities”—and 
engages in “repeated, groundless name-calling.”369 An organization is 
not an antigay hate group simply because it views homosexuality as 
unbiblical.370 CCV is officially associated with two antigay hate 
groups,371 including the American Family Association, an 
organization that in May 2010 blamed gays and lesbians for carrying 
out the Holocaust.372 
Further, much like the proponents of Colorado’s unconstitutional 
Amendment 2, CCV itself bears an overriding animus against gays 
and lesbians. According to CCV’s website, gays and lesbians suffer 
from the “disease of homosexuality”373 and, like those who engage in 
rape, incest, pedophilia, and bestiality, are a “distortion of God’s 
intention for human sexuality.”374 Moreover, CCV alleges that an 
                                                                                                                 
368 Evelyn Schlatter, 18 Anti-Gay Groups and Their Propaganda, INTELLIGENCE REP., 
Winter 2010, at 35, available at http://www.splcenter.org/get-informed/intelligence-report/ 
browse-all-issues/2010/winter/the-hard-liners. These antigay hate groups include: Abiding Truth 
Ministries, American Family Association, Americans for Truth About Homosexuality, 
American Vision, Chalcedon Foundation, Christian Anti-Defamation Commission, Concerned 
Women for America, Coral Ridge Ministries, Dove World Outreach Center, Faithful Word 
Baptist Church, Family Research Council, Family Research Institute, Heterosexuals Organized 
for a Moral Environment, Illinois Family Institute, Liberty Counsel, Mass Resistance, National 
Organization for Marriage, and Traditional Values Coalition. Id. at 35–43. 
369 Id. at 35. 
370 Id. 
371 See CITIZENS FOR COMMUNITY VALUES (May 18, 2011), http://www.ccv.org (stating 
that CCV is officially associated with the American Family Association and the Family 
Research Council). 
372 See Bryan Fischer, Homosexuality, Hitler, and ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’, 
RENEWAMERICA (May 28, 2010), http://www.renewamerica.com/columns/fischer/100528 
(“ Homosexuality gays us Adolph Hitler, and homosexuals in the military gave us the Brown 
Shirts, the Nazi war machine and six million dead Jews.” ). Bryan Fischer is the American 
Family Association’s Director of Issue Analysis for Government and Public Policy. See also 
Schlatter, supra note 368, at 36 (noting that the American Family Association is an antigay hate 
group in part because of Fischer’s comments blaming gays and lesbians for the Holocaust). 
373 Homosexuality: Where Do We Stand?, CITIZENS FOR COMMUNITY VALUES, http:// 
www.ccv.org/issues/homosexuality/where-do-we-stand/ (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
374 Id. 
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elaborate and militant network of homosexual activists is targeting 
school children, some as young as elementary school, and 
encouraging them to engage in sodomy.375 CCV predicts that this 
indoctrination could result in a rising number of homosexuals “in the 
next ten to fifteen years if concerned, informed citizens do not 
actively resist the organized effort to normalize homosexual behavior 
in our society, especially in our schools.”376 According to CCV, gays 
and lesbians, who allegedly enjoy greater income and education 
levels than the rest of America,377 should not enjoy the protection of 
antidiscrimination laws.378 Instead, gays and lesbians are deserving of 
“legitimate discrimination” because “the militant agenda of 
homosexual activists represents the single greatest threat to . . . Judeo-
Christian family values, and to societal stability as a whole, of this 
generation.”379  
In the mid-1990s the proponents of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 
which was struck down in Romer because of its inherent animus 
towards the LGBT community,380 made nearly identical arguments in 
their initiative campaign. For example, CFV often portrayed gays and 
lesbians as elitists undeserving of discrimination protection and as 
deviants and pedophiles who preyed upon school children.381 The 
                                                                                                                 
375 Id. (“The purpose of [the Gay, Lesbian, Straight Education Network (GLSEN) and 
other gay-straight alliances] is to train gay and lesbian students for activism and to encourage 
‘straight’ students to experiment with homosexual behavior . . . .”). 
376 Id. 
377 Id. The claim that gays and lesbians inherently have higher levels of income than their 
heterosexual counterparts, however, is false. In a recent USA Today report in comparing same-
sex couples who identified as “married” and opposite-sex married couples, same-sex spousal 
couples enjoyed an average income of $91,558 while opposite-sex married couples enjoyed an 
average income of $95,075. Report: Gay Couples Similar to Straight Spouses in Age, Income, 
USA TODAY (Nov. 3, 2009, 3:09 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2009-11-02-
census-gay-couples_N.htm. Similarly, in a study analyzing the economic impact of being gay or 
lesbian in the United States, the New York Times reported that, in the worst case scenario, a 
same-sex couple would pay $467,562 more than an identical opposite-sex couple over the 
course of their lifetime. Tara Siegel Bernard & Ron Lieber, The Costs of Being a Gay Couple 
Run Higher, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2009, at A1. In the best case scenario, a same-sex couple 
would only pay $41,196 more than an identical opposite-sex couple. Id. Furthermore, since 
fringe benefits can make up a substantial percent of an employee’s income, the denial of 
domestic partnership benefits would only exacerbate the income disparities between same-sex 
and opposite-sex couples. 
378 CITIZENS FOR COMMUNITY VALUES, supra note 373. 
379 Id. 
380 See discussion supra Part IV.B.1. 
381 See, e.g., Debbage Alexander, supra note 364, at 276–77 & n.68, 278 (discussing how 
Amendment 2’s proponents characterized gays and lesbians as pedophiles who, because of their 
elitist economic status, did not need anti-discrimination protection); Eskridge, Jr., supra note 
365, at 1352–53, 1382–83 n. 238 (discussing how CFV characterized gays and lesbians as 
undeserving of “special” rights because they were deviants who wanted to indoctrinate and 
molest school children). For an interesting account on the history and evolution of antigay 
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CFV also declared that gay men regularly molested children and 
ingested urine and feces.382 
Interestingly, proponents of Ohio’s Marriage Amendment shared 
similar bizarre and off-putting sentiments at a Columbus forum 
concerning Issue 1. At this event, Patrick Johnston, the vice chairman 
of the Constitution Party’s Ohio branch, represented the pro-
Amendment side.383 Although Johnston was not officially affiliated 
with CCV, he actively worked alongside Phil Burress to place the 
initiative on the ballot.384 At the forum Johnston declared, “I support 
and endorse the criminalization of homosexuality.”385 He also stated 
that the imposition of the death penalty for homosexuality was not 
necessarily unreasonable.386 He said that the use of the death penalty 
for gays and lesbians should be subject to “in-house debate [because] 
[t]here were capital crimes in the Bible, and that would be something 
debated.”387 
3. CCV Intentionally Misled Voters About the Scope of Issue 1 
According to Justice Kelly’s dissent in National Pride at Work, 
Inc. v. Governor of Michigan,388 where the Michigan Supreme Court 
declaring domestic partnership benefits unconstitutional under the 
Michigan Marriage Amendment,389 ballot initiative proponents should 
not be rewarded for intentionally misleading voters about an 
                                                                                                                 
 
discourse, see id. at 1338–53. 
382 See Adams, Jr., Animus, supra note 338 at 469 n.111 (stating that Amendment 2’s 
proponents claimed that gay men are pedophiles, will overrun the country’s hospitals with 
AIDS, and that they “have sex with over 1,000 partners, urinate or defecate on each other, and 
ingest urine and feces”) (citing Daniel A. Batterman, Comment, Evans v. Romer: The Political 
Process, Levels of Generality, and Perceived Identifiability in Anti-Gay Rights Initiatives, 29 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 915, 938 (1995)). 
383 See Alan Johnson, Homosexuality Should Be Crime, Proponent of State Issue 1 Says, 
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Oct. 9, 2004, at B5; see also Michelle Goldberg, Homosexuals Are 
Hellbound!, SALON.COM (Oct. 18, 2004), http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2004/10/18/ 
gayohio/index.html (describing a debate in which Johnston described homosexuality as sinful 
and immoral). 
384 See Johnson, supra note 383 (noting how Johnston extensively collected signatures to 
place Issue 1 on the November 2004 ballot); Goldberg, supra note 383 (describing Johnston’s 
work and relationship with the founder of CCV, Phil Burress). 
385 Johnson, supra note 383. 
386 Goldberg, supra note 383 (noting that while Johnston denied that he had ever advocated 
for the imposition of the death penalty for homosexuals, he viewed the issue as a matter to be 
left for the states to decide). 
387 Id. 
388 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008). 
389 Id. at 543. 
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amendment’s scope.390 If the sponsors of a marriage initiative tell 
voters that the proposed amendment will not harm state domestic 
partnership programs, then the courts should not declare those 
programs unconstitutional—even if, post-ratification, the 
amendment’s sponsors claim otherwise.391 
During the campaign over Issue 1, CCV intentionally misled Ohio 
voters about the Amendment’s scope. In an effort to appeal to more 
moderate voters, the OCPM, CCV’s political action committee,392 
created campaign materials that promoted the Amendment as a 
narrow law that would not hurt Ohio’s domestic partnerships. Indeed, 
OCPM even entitled the initiative the “Marriage Protection 
Amendment,”393 thereby insinuating that Issue 1 would only “protect 
marriage.” Once the Amendment passed, however, CCV performed a 
bait-and-switch, launching a campaign to end Ohio’s domestic 
partnership programs, institutions that enjoyed and continue to enjoy 
majority support throughout Ohio.394 
In addition to harboring animus towards gays and lesbians, CCV 
always intended to use Issue 1 to remove Ohio’s public domestic 
partnership programs. When Barry Sheets, CCV’s current Director of 
Governmental Affairs and the former Columbus Director of OCPM, 
was challenged in a radio debate about the Amendment’s impact on 
domestic partnership benefits, he responded that “domestic partner 
benefits that are offered by a governmental entity would not be 
allowed under [the Ohio Marriage Amendment].”395 Likewise, in an 
article for Salon.com, Phil Burress, CCV’s founder, expressed his 
contempt for public domestic partnership programs and stated that 
public institutions are “using taxpayer money and giving out the 
benefits of marriage when they have no right to do so.”396  
                                                                                                                 
390 Id. at 545–49 (Kelly, J., dissenting). 
391 See id at 548–49 (“[A] majority of likely voters favored an amendment that would bar 
same-sex marriage but would go no further. Therefore, this Court’s majority errs by holding that 
the amendment not only bars same-sex marriage but also prohibits the benefits at issue.”).  
392 See Brief for Citizens for Community Values as Amicus Curiae Urging Reversal, supra 
note 7, at 1 (highlighting the control CCV had over OCPM). 
393 For a partial reproduction of the Ohio Secretary of State’s 2004 Issue 1 Report, see 
infra Appendix G. 
394 See Jeffrey R. Lax & Justin H. Phillips, Gay Rights in the States: Public Opinion and 
Policy Responsiveness, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 367 (2009) (Online Appendix Only, at 49, fig. 
7), http://www.columbia.edu/~jrl2124/Lax_Phillips_Gay_Policy_Responsiveness_2009.pdf 
(finding that, based upon data from 1994–2008, nearly 60% of Ohioans support health benefits 
for same-sex partners). 
395 90.3 at 9 (Radio Interview on 90.3 WCPN broadcast Oct. 18, 2004) (Timestamp 
45:45—45:53), http://www.wcpn.org/index.php/WCPN/nine/8260/. 
396 Goldberg, supra note 383. 
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Once the Amendment passed, CCV made good on its intentions. 
David R. Langdon, CCV’s attorney and the author of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment, has served as plaintiff’s counsel in all three 
cases challenging the constitutionality of Ohio’s domestic partnership 
programs.397 In the most recent case, Cleveland Taxpayers for the 
Ohio Constitution v. City of Cleveland,398 Langdon argued that 
Cleveland’s domestic partnership registry, in which same-sex couples 
make up 82% of all registrants,399 is illegal because: 
The meaning of [the Ohio Marriage] Amendment is readily 
ascertainable from the words used. The first sentence is clear 
and unambiguous in defining marriage as ‘a union between 
one man and one woman.’ The second sentence, which is at 
issue in this case, is also clear and unambiguous. It prohibits 
the state and its political subdivisions from creating or 
recognizing a legal status for relationships that approximate 
marriage, such as ‘civil unions’ or ‘domestic 
partnerships.’”400  
Despite Langdon’s claims of textual clarity, however, the sponsors of 
his amendment worked hard to convince Ohioans that the initiative 
would not impact the state’s domestic partnership programs. 
Looking at the pro-Issue 1 TV, radio, and newspaper 
advertisements that are archived on OCPM’s website;401 the Ohio 
Secretary of State’s Issues Report,402 where the OCPM officially 
advertised the scope of the Marriage Amendment; and the general 
information available on OCPM’s webpage, one would get the 
distinct impression that Issue 1 would not adversely affect Ohio’s 
domestic partnership programs. On OCPM’s website, there are two 
newspaper ads, four radio ads, and one television advertisement in 
favor of the Amendment.403 None of the TV or radio ads directly 
mention the Amendment’s impact on Ohio’s domestic partnership 
                                                                                                                 
397 See supra Part I (discussing Landon’s representation of plaintiffs who have challenged 
Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and benefits programs). 
398 No. 94327, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2010). 
399 See infra Table 1 (providing data on Ohio’s domestic partner registries). 
400 Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary and Permanent Injunctions, with Memorandum in 
Support at 5, Cleveland Taxpayers, 2010 Ohio App. LEXIS 3981 (No. CV-09-701308) (citation 
omitted). 
401 Legal Issues & News, OHIO CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT MARRIAGE, http://www. 
ohiomarriage.com/Legal_Issues_&_News.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). 
402 See infra Appendix G. 
403 OHIO CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT MARRIAGE, supra note 401. The two newspaper ads are 
reproduced infra in Appendix C, D, E, and F. The television ad and four radio ads are 
transcribed infra in Appendix B and are on file with author. 
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programs.404 Although one radio ad briefly states that the “benefits of 
marriage” should be given only to married couples,405 the ad does not 
define the “benefits of marriage” or the extent to which the “benefits 
of marriage” could or should be curtailed.406 Overall, the radio ads 
more explicitly discuss Ohio’s tax rates than the fate of Ohio’s 
domestic partnership programs.407 Additionally, the vast majority of 
these radio and television ads suggest that the Amendment is only 
about keeping marriage between one man and one woman, calling the 
entire campaign an issue of “respect for marriage” and “common 
sense.”408 
Furthermore, the two newspaper ads archived on OCPM’s website 
clearly state that Issue 1 would not remove Ohio’s domestic 
partnership programs. The first newspaper ad, “Private Life,”409 
shows a photograph of two elderly women.410 Beneath them in bold 
and large font OCPM states “Don’t be confused about Issue 1. 
Protecting marriage won’t hurt unmarried citizens.”411 
Underneath this declaration, the ad provides, in bold font, caps, and 
italics, a “question and answer” section about the Amendment’s 
scope.412 According to the ad, “Q: Will [Issue 1] still protect the 
benefits individuals and unmarried couples receive from their 
employers? A: YES It allows for no interference with contracts 
between private parties.”413 The ad finishes by urging people to 
ignore the “wild claims” against Issue 1 and by reassuring voters that 
Issue 1 is only about reserving marriage as an institution for one man 
and one woman.414 There is no other mention about the impact of 
Issue 1’s second sentence.415  
                                                                                                                 
404 See infra Appendix B. 
405 “Both Ways” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B. 
406 “Both Ways” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B. 
407 See “What You Know” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B. 
408 See, e.g., “Common Sense” Television Ad, infra Appendix B (arguing that it is 
“common sense” for marriage in Ohio to be between one man and one woman); “Common 
Sense” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B (“Voting ‘Yes’ on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage Amendment, 
is just common sense.”); “Respect” Radio Ad, infra Appendix B (arguing that the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment is respectful towards gays and lesbians because it upholds God’s law and 
divine truth). 
409 Infra Appendices C, D. 
410 Infra Appendix C. 
411 Infra Appendices C, D. 
412 Infra Appendix D. 
413 Infra Appendix D. 
414 Infra Appendix D. 
415 Infra Appendix D. 
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Similarly, in the newspaper ad “Common Sense,”416 there is a 
picture of a bride and groom holding hands.417 Below the picture is a 
text box asking in large and bold font “Will Issue 1 also protect 
unmarried Ohioans?”.418 Underneath this heading is the question 
“Will [Issue 1] still protect the benefits individuals and unmarried 
couples receive from their employers?”419 Next to this question, in 
capital letters and in large, bold font is the answer “YES.”420 
Surrounding this text box the ad urges Ohioans to vote for Issue 1 
only “to keep marriage between one man and one woman.”421 There 
is no suggestion whatsoever in this ad that the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment would affect Ohio’s domestic partnership programs.422 
Additionally, the Ohio Secretary of State’s Issues Report, which 
does not vet for truth or accuracy, also failed to inform average voters 
about OCPM’s intentions.423 Under the heading “WHAT ISSUE 1 
DOES,” OCPM states that “[i]ssue 1 restricts governmental bodies in 
Ohio from using your tax dollars to give official status, recognition 
and benefits to homosexual and other deviant relationships that seek 
to imitate marriage.”424 However, immediately below this declaration 
under the heading “WHAT ISSUE 1 DOES NOT DO,” the report 
states that “[i]ssue 1 does not interfere in any way with government 
benefits granted to persons in non-marital homosexual relationships, 
so long as the government does not grant those benefits to such 
persons specifically for the reason that the relationship is one that 
seeks to imitate marriage.”425 In addition to being contradictory, these 
declarations purposefully do not define “other deviant relationships,” 
“government benefits,” or a relationship that “seeks to imitate 
marriage.”426 It is also noteworthy that OCPM never once suggests 
that Issue 1 will affect, or is intended to affect, the rights and benefits 
of straight couples in nonmarital relationships; the only benefits 
programs that concern OCPM are those that are offered to “non-
marital homosexual relationships.”427 
                                                                                                                 
416 Infra Appendices E, F. 
417 Infra Appendix E. 
418 Infra Appendix E. 
419 Infra Appendix F. 
420 Infra Appendix F. 
421 Infra Appendix F. 
422 Infra Appendix F. 
423 See infra Appendix G. 
424 Infra Appendix G. 
425 Infra Appendix G.  
426 Infra Appendix G. 
427 Infra Appendix G. 
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Finally, OCPM’s general website also sought to confuse voters 
about the scope of Issue 1’s second sentence. In one lengthy diatribe 
about the Marriage Amendment’s potential effects, OCPM states that 
Issue 1 would “strictly [limit] the benefits of marriage to those who 
are married and keep them from being given to unmarried 
heterosexual or homosexual individuals, if the intent was to copy the 
design of marriage, thereby circumventing marriage laws and 
accessing its benefits through a back door.”428 However, in an e-
newsletter, also available on OCPM’s website, OCPM urged its 
supporters to tell undecided voters that “[i]n matters of health 
benefits . . . private companies and governments are not allowed to 
discriminate on the basis of marital status”429 and that “[t]he second 
sentence [of the Ohio Marriage Amendment] simply guarantees that 
the state and its political subdivisions will not . . . creat[e] ‘civil 
unions’ or some other relationship that imitates marriage in all but 
name.”430  
Therefore, despite recent assertions that the Marriage Amendment 
clearly prohibits Ohio from recognizing domestic partnerships, 
OCPM and CCV wanted voters to believe that Issue 1 would not 
affect Ohio’s domestic partnership registries or health insurance 
programs. 
4. Conclusion 
CCV and the OCPM misled voters about the scope of Issue 1 and 
abused Ohio’s ballot initiative process.  
The Founding Fathers feared that direct democracy could easily be 
manipulated to deny civil rights to minorities, and Ohio’s ballot 
initiative process proves that those fears were well-founded. Ohio’s 
ballot initiative process lacks meaningful checks and balances and, as 
such, is inherently vulnerable to manipulation.  
Issue 1 proponents took advantage of these weaknesses and drafted 
an ambiguous piece of legislation designed to discriminate against 
gays and lesbians. They then played into discriminatory stereotypes 
about gays and lesbians while simultaneously advertising that Issue 1 
would not affect Ohio’s domestic partnership programs. After Issue 1 
passed, CCV launched a campaign against Ohio’s public domestic 
                                                                                                                 
428 The Facts About Issue 1, OHIO CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT MARRIAGE, http://www. 
ohiomarriage.com/Facts_About_Issue_1.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2010). 
429 E-Newsletter: The Home Stretch, OHIO CAMPAIGN TO PROTECT MARRIAGE (Oct. 30, 
2004), http://www.ohiomarriage.com/E-News-10302004.htm (emphasis omitted). 
430 Id. 
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partnership registries and health insurance programs, which are 
overwhelmingly used by same-sex couples, and claimed that the 
Amendment prohibited these institutions.  
The entire history of Issue 1 is predicated upon ambiguity, 
obfuscation, and lies. CCV and OCPM always intended to harm 
Ohio’s gay and lesbian community, but never explained their agenda 
to the voters. Since Issue 1 passed via ballot initiative, the courts are 
the only check upon the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Considering the 
intentionally manipulative actions of the Amendment’s proponents, 
the second sentence of Ohio’s facially neutral Marriage Amendment 
should be found to target gays and lesbians, as prohibited under 
Feeney’s second prong, and to violate the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
C. The Removal of Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Programs Would 
Prove an Intent to Harm Same-Sex Couples in  
Violation of Lawrence and Romer 
Finally, this section contends that if the second sentence of the 
Ohio Marriage Amendment invalidates Ohio’s public domestic 
partnership programs, then the second sentence would result in almost 
limitless discriminatory consequences to Ohio’s LGBT community. 
Per Lawrence and Romer,431 these broad, statewide effects would 
necessarily betray an intentional, and unconstitutional, antigay animus 
that would satisfy Feeney’s second prong in violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In Lawrence v. Texas,432 the Supreme Court held that states could 
not criminally punish gays and lesbians for engaging in intimate 
sexual conduct.433 Although the Court claimed that its opinion did not 
affect state recognition of same-sex couples,434 the majority’s 
reasoning clearly impacts the status of same-sex relationships.435 
According to the Court, adult gays and lesbians not only have a 
protected right to engage in private, intimate relations,436 but to form 
                                                                                                                 
431 For additional information on Lawrence and Romer, see supra Part IV.B. 
432 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
433 Id. at 578 (“The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its 
intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”). 
434 Id. (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the government must give formal 
recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons seek to enter.”). 
435 Indeed the Court’s language so obviously affects state recognition of same-sex couples 
that Scalia’s dissent scathingly noted that “[t]his case ‘does not involve’ the issue of 
homosexual marriage only if one entertains the belief that principle and logic have nothing to do 
with the decisions of this Court.” Id. at 605 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
436 Id. at 567 (majority opinion) (“[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in 
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committed and loving same-sex couples.437 The Court noted that, 
although sex is undoubtedly important to same-sex couples, much 
like it is important to opposite-sex couples, “intimate conduct . . . can 
be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring.”438 The 
Court also recognized that “personal decisions relating to 
marriage . . . [and] family relationships”439 are afforded constitutional 
protection,440 and that “[t]hese matters, [which] involv[e] the most 
intimate and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime, 
choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the 
liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”441 The Court 
finished its opinion with an invitation for future generations to end 
institutionalized hatreds, declaring that morality, history, and tradition 
alone are insufficient reasons to maintain discriminatory laws.442 
According to the Court, “times can blind us to certain truths and later 
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in 
fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in 
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for 
greater freedom.”443  
The Lawrence decision greatly impacts the status of same-sex 
couples. Under Lawrence, gays and lesbians have a Fourteenth 
Amendment right to: 1) be gay, 2) engage in consensual sex, and 
3) enter into same-sex relationships. If same-sex couples have a 
Fourteenth Amendment right to exist under Lawrence, then what right 
do the states have in turning these relationships into pariah-like non-
entities at every level of state government, even down to the most 
local municipal level? The answer, under Romer, is “none.” 
Under Romer v. Evans,444 the second sentence of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment contains an unconstitutional animus against 
gays and lesbians. In Romer, the Supreme Court invalidated 
Colorado’s Amendment 2, which “prohibit[ed] all legislative, 
executive or judicial action at any level of state or local government 
                                                                                                                 
 
the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free 
persons.”). 
437 Id. at 574, 577–78 (finding that persons have a Fourteenth Amendment right to enter 
into same-sex relationships and engage in intimate sexual behavior). 
438 Id. at 567. 
439 Id. at 574. 
440 Id. 
441 Id. (quoting Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 US. 833, 851 
(1992)). 
442 Id. at 571–572. 
443 Id. at 579. 
444 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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designed to protect [gays and lesbians]”445 and “repeal[ed] and 
forb[ade] all laws or policies providing specific protection for gays or 
lesbians from discrimination by every level of Colorado 
government.”446 To overcome Amendment 2 and its wealth of 
consequences,447 Colorado’s gay community would have needed to 
“enlist[] the citizenry of Colorado to amend the State 
Constitution . . . . This is so no matter how local or discrete the harm, 
no matter how public and widespread the injury.”448 According to the 
Court, Amendment 2’s “sheer breadth is so discontinuous with the 
reasons offered for it that the amendment seems inexplicable by 
anything but animus,”449 and that Amendment 2 lacked “any 
identifiable legitimate purpose or discrete objective.”450  
Similarly, if Ohio’s domestic partnership programs were declared 
unconstitutional, then the State of Ohio would effectively prohibit any 
and all recognition for same-sex couples at every level of 
government. This prohibition would stand no matter how limited or 
local the recognition would be, and it would stand until a group of 
individuals successfully petitioned Ohio’s citizenry to amend the 
constitution. If Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are invalidated, 
then the resulting hardships imposed on Ohio’s LGBT community 
would prove that the Marriage Amendment’s second sentence is 
based on antigay animus and lacks a legitimate government 
interest.451 
                                                                                                                 
445 Id. at 624. 
446 Id. at 629.  
447 See id. at 628–630 (noting that Amendment 2 would affect both private and public life 
in Colorado). The Supreme Court also recognized that Amendment 2 could possibly affect 
general antidiscrimination laws in Colorado, but the Court found that it did not need to decide 
this issue to rule against Amendment 2. Id. at 630–31. 
448 Id. at 631.  
449 Id. at 632.  
450 Id. at 635. 
451 Moreover, the fact that Ohio’s Marriage Amendment would impact every level of Ohio 
government is especially salient in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. In Equality Found. of 
Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 525 
U.S. 943 (1998), the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a Cincinnati Charter Amendment 
that prohibited anti-discrimination protection for gays and lesbians in large part because of the 
amendment’s local nature. According to the Court:  
The low level of government at which Article XII becomes operative is significant 
because the opponents of that strictly local enactment need not undertake the 
monumental political task of procuring an amendment to the Ohio Constitution as a 
precondition to achievement of a desired change in the local law, but instead may 
either seek local repeal of the subject amendment through ordinary municipal 
political processes, or pursue relief from every higher level of Ohio government 
including but not limited to Hamilton County, state agencies, the Ohio legislature, or 
the voters themselves via a statewide initiative. 
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Admittedly, unlike Amendment 2, Ohio’s Marriage Amendment 
does not specifically single out gays and lesbians for unjust 
treatment.452 The neutrality of the Amendment’s text, however, does 
not change the fact that: 1) Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are 
overwhelmingly used by same-sex couples,453 2) same-sex couples 
cannot legally leave Ohio’s “unmarried class,” regardless of the 
Amendment,454 3) the author of the Marriage Amendment has served 
as plaintiff’s counsel in all three cases seeking to end Ohio’s domestic 
partnership programs,455 and 4) the Amendment’s sponsors intended 
to remove Ohio’s domestic partnership programs through the 
Amendment’s second sentence, but did not inform the public of their 
intent.456  
The second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment states 
“[t]his state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize 
a legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage.”457 Neither the author of the Ohio Marriage amendment nor 
                                                                                                                 
 
Id. at 297. 
452 Those who support CCV might further argue that CCV’s amicus brief in State v. 
Carswell, 871 N.E.2d 547 (Ohio 2007), shows that CCV did not intend for the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment to affect only gays and lesbians because Carswell involved an unmarried 
heterosexual couple. Brief for Citizens for Community Values as Amicus Curiae Urging 
Reversal, supra note 7, at 2. This argument, however, does not negate CCV’s misleading 
advertisements or the hatred that CCV bears against Ohio’s LGBT community. See discussion 
supra Part VI.B. Much like the Moralistic Position found in the writings of Lynn Wardle and 
Lynne Marie Kohm, CCV’s position against domestic partnerships, at its core, revolves around 
animus towards gays and lesbians. See supra note 250 (discussing the writings of Lynne Marie 
Kohm and Lynn Wardle); discussion supra Part VI.B.2 (detailing CCV’s animus towards gays 
and lesbians). Additionally, CCV’s position can be explained away by the circumstances 
surrounding Carswell.  
Most likely, CCV’s position on Ohio’s domestic violence statute was formed well after the 
enactment of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. First, state marriage amendments are considered 
to be civil, not criminal, laws. Prior to State v. Burk, No. CR-462150, 2005 WL 786212 (Ohio 
Ct. Com. Pl. Mar. 23, 2005), rev’d, 843 N.E.2d 1254 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005), no one had ever 
argued that a marriage amendment could invalidate state criminal code. Unlike Brinkman, 
Hicks, and Cleveland Taxpayers for Ohio Constitution, which were all argued by Amendment 
author David Langdon, Burk’s arguments were made by a defense attorney who had nothing to 
do with CCV. Id. Second, since Carswell was the first time the Supreme Court of Ohio 
addressed the Marriage Amendment, CCV was probably hesitant to advocate for a narrow 
reading. If CCV had done so, then they risked the Ohio Supreme Court limiting the second 
sentence to only civil unions, thereby weakening CCV’s campaign against Ohio’s domestic 
partnership programs. Thus, CCV’s amicus brief in Carswell does not negate their intent to 
target same-sex couples under the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. 
453 See supra Part V.  
454 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3101.01(C) (West 2010). 
455 See supra Part I. 
456 See supra Part VI.B. 
457 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11. 
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any Ohio court has ever provided a definition for a “legal status” that 
“intends to approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage.”458 Additionally, no Ohio court has ever defined “the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”459 For example, 
is the effect of marriage the spousal testimonial privilege, or is it the 
right to inherit intestate?460 Regardless of the answers to these 
questions, however, it is entirely within the purview of the Ohio 
judiciary to conclude that Ohio’s domestic partnership registries and 
benefits programs violate the Ohio Constitution.461  
If the Supreme Court of Ohio invalidates Ohio’s domestic 
partnership registries, then every public entity in Ohio would be 
prohibited from recognizing same-sex couples so long as the 
Amendment remains in effect. Ohio’s domestic partnership registries 
offer its registrants no legal benefits whatsoever.462 At most, these 
registries offer a token symbolism to its registrants,463 who are 
overwhelmingly same-sex couples.464 Therefore, if a registry that 
                                                                                                                 
458 Id. It should be noted that the phrase “intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage” does not modify the phrase “relationships of unmarried 
individuals,” but rather the “legal status” that Ohio is forbidden from creating or recognizing. 
The conjugation of “to intend” in this instance is for a subject in the third-person singular, “a 
legal status.” Thus the “legal status” itself must “intend” to “approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage.” If the phrase “intends to approximate the design, qualities, 
significance or effect of marriage” was to modify the phrase “relationships of unmarried 
individuals” then “to intend” would have had to be conjugated in the third-person plural, and the 
sentence would read “[t]his state and its political subdivisions shall not create or recognize a 
legal status for relationships of unmarried individuals that intend to approximate the design, 
qualities, significance or effect of marriage.”  
A close reading of the Amendment’s text directly contradicts what the Ohio Campaign to 
Protect Marriage wrote in their statement for the Ohio Secretary of State’s Issues Report. See 
infra Appendix G. In its report, OCPM wrote that “Issue 1 does not interfere in any way with 
government benefits granted to persons in non-marital homosexual relationships, so long as the 
government does not grant those benefits to such persons specifically for the reason that the 
relationship is one that seeks to imitate marriage.” Id. Although OCPM provides no definition 
for a relationship that “seeks to imitate marriage,” the subjective intent of those in a same-sex 
relationship is irrelevant in the State’s granting of recognition. Those in a same-sex relationship 
may very well intend to “approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage.” 
However, if the State does not bestow upon this same-sex couple a “legal status” that “intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of marriage,” then it is perfectly legal 
under Ohio’s Marriage Amendment. 
459 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11 (emphasis added). 
460 See Strasser, supra note 14, at 82–83 (discussing the importance of the word “the” in 
Ohio’s Marriage Amendment and what could possibly be “the significance” or “the effect” of 
marriage). 
461 Cf. Nat’l Pride at Work, Inc. v. Governor of Michigan, 748 N.W.2d 524 (Mich. 2008) 
(holding that Michigan’s public domestic partnership benefits programs violated the Michigan 
Marriage Amendment).  
462 See supra Part V.A. 
463 See supra part V.A. 
464 See supra Part V.B. 
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provides no benefits violates the Ohio Marriage Amendment, then 
any program that does offer tangible or legal benefits—such as health 
insurance or sick leave—must necessarily be unconstitutional as well. 
The consequences of such a decision would be catastrophic.  
Imagine that there is a married, same-sex couple from Iowa 
driving through Ohio and they get into a car accident. What legal 
rights and remedies could that couple have if even symbolic 
recognition violates the Ohio Marriage Amendment? Barring a 
change in the Ohio Constitution, many causes of action, such as loss 
of consortium, would be out of their reach,465 and the judiciary would 
be prohibited from granting any exception.466 Additionally, if one of 
the partners were to die, how would the surviving spouse retrieve the 
other’s body? Although this couple could travel with their marriage 
license and various testamentary documents, there is no guarantee 
that Ohio would—or even could—honor them. For example, in 
Rhode Island, Mark Goldberg and his partner of seventeen years had 
married in Connecticut and executed wills, living wills, and powers of 
attorney for each other, but it still took Goldberg over a month to 
receive his partner’s body from the state.467  
Additionally, the situation would not necessarily be better if the 
Ohio Supreme Court condoned domestic partnership registries, but 
declared Ohio’s public domestic partnership benefits programs 
unconstitutional. The granting of health insurance to school and 
municipal employees in committed same-sex relationships hardly 
creates a “legal status” that approximates the significance of 
marriage. Health insurance is not a design, quality, significance or 
effect of marriage in Ohio or in any other state.468 In fact, thousands 
of married Ohioans go without health insurance every year.469 In 
                                                                                                                 
465 See Haas v. Lewis, 456 N.E.2d 512, 513 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982) (“[T]he right of 
consortium, by its very definition, is a right which grows out of marriage, is incident to 
marriage, and cannot exist without marriage. Because it is a marital right, the right of 
consortium is not conferred upon partners to extramarital cohabitation.”). 
466 Cf. Bashaway v. Cheney Bros., Inc., 987 So.2d 93, 95–96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008) 
(noting that, because the Florida legislature prohibited same-sex marriage, the Florida judiciary 
could not allow same-sex couples a cause of action for loss of consortium). 
467 See supra notes 287–91 and accompanying text. 
468 In fact, in response to recent federal health care reform, several states have passed laws 
prohibiting the state from requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. See, e.g., Rosalind 
S. Helderman, Va. Lawmakers Pass Health-Plan Bill, WASH. POST, Mar. 11, 2010, at B4 
(discussing Virginia’s prohibition on mandated health insurance). Furthermore, Catholic 
Charities stopped offering health insurance to the spouses of all employees in Washington, D.C. 
specifically because Washington, D.C. had legalized same-sex marriage. See William Wan, 
Catholic Charities to Limit Health Benefits to Spouses, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2010, at A1. 
469 See Jack Torry, Uninsured Ohioans Have Lots of Company, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, 
Apr. 8, 2009, at 04B. (reporting that there are 2.8 million uninsured Ohioans, that 71 percent of 
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contrast, the ability for married couples to make medical decisions for 
one another is a positive right in Ohio.470 If the granting of health 
insurance, which is not a right guaranteed to married couples, 
somehow “create[s] or recognize[s] a legal status . . . that intends to 
approximate the design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage,”471 then allowing same-sex couples to make important life 
and death decisions for one another must inherently be prohibited by 
Ohio’s public institutions as well.472 
If the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment is found 
to prohibit all recognition of “unmarried” couples, then same-sex 
couples who are forbidden from marrying will be non-entities under 
Ohio law. Unlike opposite-sex couples who may freely choose to get 
married, Ohio’s same-sex couples will be forced into an almost 
pariah-like status, even at the municipal level. To receive health 
insurance, token recognition, or claim each other’s bodies from the 
state, same-sex couples would need to amend the Ohio Constitution. 
And this outcome is exactly what the sponsors of the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment hope will occur.473 Simply put, no reason short of sheer 
animus for gays and lesbians could explain an amendment of such 
broad and merciless scope.  
If Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are ever invalidated 
under the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment, then 
that sentence must be unconstitutional. According to Lawrence and 
Romer, the effects of such a decision would be so broad as to render 
Ohio’s same-sex couples legal pariahs and betray the Amendment’s 
intentional antigay animus—thereby satisfying Feeney’s second 
prong and violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  
                                                                                                                 
 
this group went more than six months without any health insurance, and that these numbers are 
expected to get worse). 
470 See State v. Ramirez, No. C-050981, 2006 WL 3040638, at *3 (Ohio Ct. App. Oct. 27, 
2006) (stating that married couples may make medical decisions for each other).  
471 OHIO CONST. art. XV, § 11. 
472 However, this possible state prohibition may be preempted by federal law. See supra 
notes 251–53 and accompanying text (discussing newly promulgated federal rules requiring 
hospitals to respect a patient’s choice of visitors and health care proxies). 
473 See supra Part VI.B.2–3.  
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VII. CONCLUSION 
According to Feeney, a facially neutral law that disparately 
impacts an unnamed group violates equal protection if the “totality of 
actions” surrounding the law’s enactment reflects an intent to 
discriminate against that group.474 The removal of Ohio’s domestic 
partnership registries and health benefits programs would disparately 
impact same-sex couples. Further, the “totality of actions” 
surrounding the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment 
reflects an “invidious discriminatory purpose” against gays and 
lesbians. This purpose can be found in three ways.  
First, by looking at the history and practice of domestic partnership 
programs throughout the United States and Ohio, it is obvious that 
domestic partnership programs are designed primarily to help same-
sex couples. Therefore, any attack against Ohio’s domestic 
partnership programs is inherently an attack against Ohio’s LGBT 
community.  
Second, CCV and OCPM launched an underhanded ballot 
initiative campaign in order to harm Ohio’s LGBT citizenry. CCV 
and OCPM always intended for the second sentence of the Marriage 
Amendment to prohibit all state recognition of same-sex couples, but 
advertised to voters that Issue 1 would not harm domestic partnership 
programs and was limited in its scope. Once Issue 1 passed, CCV 
advocated a broader interpretation of the Ohio Marriage Amendment. 
With the approval and cooperation of CCV, the Amendment’s author, 
David Langdon, launched a campaign against Ohio’s domestic 
partnership programs. As a result of CCV’s propaganda about the 
Amendment’s true impact and scope, the second sentence of the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment should be seen a discriminatory piece of 
legislation aimed at Ohio’s LGBT community.  
Finally, if Ohio’s domestic partnership programs are ever 
invalidated under the second sentence of the Marriage Amendment, 
then the resulting effect on Ohio’s lesbian and gay citizens would be 
broad and merciless. These consequences would betray the second 
sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment as a law built on 
intentional antigay animus. This intentional hatred of same-sex 
couples would be impermissible under both Lawrence and Romer, 
and satisfy Feeney’s second prong. 
                                                                                                                 
474 Pers. Adm’r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 280 (1979). 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
2011] WHEN ROMER MET FEENEY 1389 
Therefore, for all of above mentioned reasons, the federal judiciary 
should declare the second sentence of the Ohio Marriage Amendment 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
MELISSA A. YASINOW†
                                                                                                                 
† J.D. Candidate, 2011, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. 
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156 61 0 217 72% 28% 0% 
City of 
Toledo477 
80 24 6 110 73% 22% 5% 
        
TOTALS: 370 109 12 491 75% 22% 3% 
Table 1—Data on Couples in Ohio’s Domestic Partnership Registries 
 
 























27 0 27 100% 0% X 
Oberlin City 
Schools479 
1 0 1 100% 0%  
       
TOTALS: 28 0 28 100% 0% 1 
Table 2—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health 




                                                                                                                 
475 E-mail from Kim Roberson, supra note 192. 
476 E-mail from Susanna Niermann O’Neil, supra note 190. 
477 E-mail from Gerald Dendinger, supra note 191. 
478 Telephone Interview with Michael Straughter, supra note 199. 
479 Telephone Interview with Diane Wolf, supra note 198. 
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0 0 0 0% 0% X 
City of 
Columbus481 
17 40 57 30% 70%  
Franklin 
County482 
25 49 74 34% 66%  
Lucas 
County483 
5 0 5 100% 0% X 
       
TOTALS: 47 89 136 35% 65% 2 
Table 3—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health 















Bowling Green State 
University 
X   
Central State 
University 
 X  
Cleveland State 
University 
X   
Kent State University  X  
Miami University X   
Northeastern Ohio 
Universities Colleges 
of Medicine and 
Pharmacy 
(“NEOUCOM”) 
 X  
The Ohio State 
University 
 X  
Ohio University  X  
Shawnee State 
University 
  X 
                                                                                                                 
480 Telephone Interview with Bob Johnson, supra note 202. 
481 Telephone Interview with Midge Slemmer, supra note 87. 
482 E-mail from Scott Solsman, supra note 209. 
483 Telephone Interview with Colleen Abbott, supra note 210. 
 3/15/2011 2:33:32 PM 
1392 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 61:4 
University of Akron X   
University of 
Cincinnati 
 X  
University of Toledo  X  
Wright State 
University 
 X  
Youngstown State 
University 
X   
Belmont Technical 
College 
  X 
Central Ohio 
Technical College 




X   
Clark State 
Community College 
  X 
Columbus State 
Community College 
  X 
Cuyahoga Community 
College 
 X  
Eastern Gateway 
Community College 
  X 
Edison Community 
College 
  X 
Hocking College   X 
James A. Rhodes State 
College 
  X 
Lakeland Community 
College 
X   
Lorain County 
Community College 
  X 
Marion Technical 
College 
  X 
North Central State 
College 
  X 
Northwest State 
Community College 
  X 
Owens Community 
College 
  X 
Rio Grande 
Community College 
  X 
Sinclair Community 
College 
  X 
Southern State 
Community College 
  X 
Stark State College of 
Technology 
  X 
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Terra Community 
College 
  X 
Washington State 
Community College 
 X  
Zane State College   X 
    
TOTALS: 7 11 19 
Table 4—Types of Domestic Partnership Health Insurance Programs 
Available at Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges 
 
 





















9 0 9 100% 0% 
Bowling Green 
State University485 
7 0 7 100% 0% 
Central State 
University486 
1 0 1 100% 0% 
University of 
Cincinnati487 
34 59 93 37% 63% 
Cleveland State 
University488 
12 0 12 100% 0% 
Kent State 
University489 
24 21 45 53% 47% 
Miami 
University490 





1 0 1 100% 0% 
                                                                                                                 
484 Telephone Interview with Kevin Turner, supra note 226.  
485 Telephone Interview with Rebecca Ferguson, supra note 225. At Bowling Green State 
University, there are currently seven couples enrolled for domestic partnership health insurance 
and nine couples signed up for domestic partnership dental insurance. However, due to the 
limited focus of this Note, only the domestic partners receiving health insurance are included in 
the above table. 
486 Telephone Interview with Evelyn Adams, supra note 234. 
487 E-mail from Elizabeth Aumann, Dir. of Benefits, Univ. of Cincinnati, to author (Mar. 8, 
2010, 12:25 EST) (on file with author). 
488 E-mail from Gerald Modjeski, supra note 227. 
489 Telephone Interview with Loretta Shields, Manager of Univ. Benefits, Kent State Univ. 
(Dec. 22, 2009). 
490 Telephone Interview with Sherry Schilling, supra note 228. 
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Pharmacy 
(“NEOUCOM”)491 
The Ohio State 
University492 
171 29 200 86% 14% 
Ohio University493 11 13 24 46% 54% 
University of 
Toledo494 
11 21 32 34% 66% 
Wright State 
University495 
14 9 23 61% 39% 
Youngstown State 
University496 





















1 1 2 50% 50% 
      
TOTAL 332 178 510 65% 35% 
Table 5—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health 
Insurance from All of Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges 
with Partnership Policies 
 
                                                                                                                 
491 Telephone Interview with Kathy Korogi, supra note 234. 
492 E-mail from Katherine Shockley, Benefits Consultant, The Ohio State Univ., to author 
(Jan. 12, 2010, 14:06 EST) (on file with author).  
493 E-mail from Greg Fialko, Dir. of Benefits, Ohio Univ., to author (Feb. 4, 2010, 14:20 
EST) (on file with author). 
494 E-mail from Denise Shordt, Benefits Manager, Univ. of Toledo, to author (Jan. 20, 
2010, 18:21 EST) (on file with author). 
495 E-mail from Lindsey Carfrey, Benefits Generalist, Wright State Univ., to author 
(October 7, 2010, 12:47 EST) (on file with author). 
496 E-mail from Steve Lucivjansky, supra note 229. 
497 Telephone Interview with Sherry Abbott, supra note 235.  
498 Telephone Interview with Davie Rainwater, supra note 230. 
499 Telephone Interview with Tanja Foster, Benefits Adm’r, Cuyahoga Cmty. Coll. (Mar. 
10, 2010). 
500 Telephone Interview with Carol Mangino, supra note 231. 
501 Telephone Interview with Sue Murdock, Dir. of Human Res., Wash. State Cmty. Coll. 
(Dec. 12, 2009).  
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12 0 12 100% 0% 
Miami 
University 














3 0 3 100% 0% 
      
TOTAL 57 0 57 100% 0% 
Table 6—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health 
Insurance from Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges with 























1 0 1 100% 0% 
University of 
Cincinnati 
34 59 93 37% 63% 
Kent State 
University 









1 0 1 100% 0% 
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The Ohio State 
University 
171 29 200 86% 14% 
Ohio University 11 13 24 46% 54% 
University of 
Toledo 
11 21 32 34% 66% 
Wright State 
University 













1 1 2 50% 50% 
      
TOTAL 275 178 453 61% 39% 
Table 7—Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Health 
Insurance from Ohio’s Public Universities and Community Colleges 
with Gender Neutral Partnership Policies 
 
 






















28 0 28 100% 0% 
Ohio Counties 
and Cities503 






332 178 510 65% 35% 
      
TOTAL 407 267 674 60% 40% 
Table 1—Overall Data on Couples Receiving Domestic Partnership Benefits 
from Ohio’s Public Institutions 
                                                                                                                 
502 Supra Table 2. 
503 Supra Table 3. 
504 Supra Table 5. 
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APPENDIX A: 
STATE MARRIAGE AMENDMENTS 
 




Alabama Article I, 
Section 36.03 
(a) This amendment shall be known and may 
be cited as the Sanctity of Marriage 
Amendment. 
(b) Marriage is inherently a unique 
relationship between a man and a woman. As a 
matter of public policy, this state has a special 
interest in encouraging, supporting, and 
protecting this unique relationship in order to 
promote, among other goals, the stability and 
welfare of society and its children. A marriage 
contracted between individuals of the same 
sex is invalid in this state. 
(c) Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized 
between a man and a woman, which, when the 
legal capacity and consent of both parties is 
present, establishes their relationship as 
husband and wife, and which is recognized by 
the state as a civil contract. 
(d) No marriage license shall be issued in the 
State of Alabama to parties of the same sex. 
(e) The State of Alabama shall not recognize 
as valid any marriage of parties of the same 
sex that occurred or was alleged to have 
occurred as a result of the law of any 
jurisdiction regardless of whether a marriage 
license was issued. 
(f) The State of Alabama shall not recognize 
as valid any common law marriage of parties 
of the same sex. 
(g) A union replicating marriage of or between 
persons of the same sex in the State of 
Alabama or in any other jurisdiction shall be 
considered and treated in all respects as 
having no legal force or effect in this state and 
shall not be recognized by this state as a 
marriage or other union replicating marriage. 
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Arkansas Amendment 83, 
Sections 1–3 
1. Marriage 
Marriage consists only of the union of one 
man and one woman. 
2. Marital status 
Legal status for unmarried persons which is 
identical or substantially similar to marital 
status shall not be valid or recognized in 
Arkansas, except that the legislature may 
recognize a common law marriage from 
another state between a man and a woman. 
3. Capacity, rights, obligations, privileges, 
and immunities 
The legislature has the power to determine the 
capacity of persons to marry, subject to this 
amendment, and the legal rights, obligations, 
privileges, and immunities of marriage. 
Florida Article I, 
Section 27 
Inasmuch as marriage is the legal union of 
only one man and one woman as husband and 
wife, no other legal union that is treated as 
marriage or the substantial equivalent thereof 
shall be valid or recognized. 
Georgia Article I, 
Section 4, 
Paragraph I 
(a) This state shall recognize as marriage only 
the union of man and woman. Marriages 
between persons of the same sex are 
prohibited in this state. 
(b) No union between persons of the same sex 
shall be recognized by this state as entitled to 
the benefits of marriage. This state shall not 
give effect to any public act, record, or 
judicial proceeding of any other state or 
jurisdiction respecting a relationship between 
persons of the same sex that is treated as a 
marriage under the laws of such other state or 
jurisdiction. The courts of this state shall have 
no jurisdiction to grant a divorce or separate 
maintenance with respect to any such 
relationship or otherwise to consider or rule on 
any of the parties' respective rights arising as a 
result of or in connection with such 
relationship. 
Kentucky Section 233A Only a marriage between one man and one 
woman shall be valid or recognized as a 
marriage in Kentucky. A legal status identical 
or substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized. 
Idaho Article III, 
Section 28 
A marriage between a man and a woman is the 
only domestic legal union that shall be valid or 
recognized in this state. 
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Louisiana Article XII, 
Section 15 
Marriage in the state of Louisiana shall consist 
only of the union of one man and one woman. 
No official or court of the state of Louisiana 
shall construe this constitution or any state law 
to require that marriage or the legal incidents 
thereof be conferred upon any member of a 
union other than the union of one man and one 
woman. A legal status identical or 
substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized. No official or court of the state of 
Louisiana shall recognize any marriage 
contracted in any other jurisdiction which is 
not the union of one man and one woman. 
Nebraska Article I, 
Section 29 
Only marriage between a man and a woman 
shall be valid or recognized in Nebraska. The 
uniting of two persons of the same sex in a 
civil union, domestic partnership, or other 
similar same-sex relationship shall not be 





Marriage consists only of the legal union 
between a man and a woman. No other 
domestic union, however denominated, may 
be recognized as a marriage or given the same 
or substantially equivalent legal effect. 
Ohio Article XV, 
Section 11 
Only a union between one man and one 
woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this state and its political 
subdivisions. This state and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a 
legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals that intends to approximate the 
design, qualities, significance or effect of 
marriage. 
Oklahoma Article II, 
Section 35 
A. Marriage in this state shall consist only of 
the union of one man and one woman. Neither 
this Constitution nor any other provision of 
law shall be construed to require that marital 
status or the legal incidents thereof be 
conferred upon unmarried couples or groups. 
B. A marriage between persons of the same 
gender performed in another state shall not be 
recognized as valid and binding in this state as 
of the date of the marriage. 
C. Any person knowingly issuing a marriage 
license in violation of this section shall be 





A marriage between one man and one woman 
is the only lawful domestic union that shall be 
valid or recognized in this State. This State 
and its political subdivisions shall not create a 
legal status, right, or claim respecting any 
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other domestic union, however denominated. 
This State and its political subdivisions shall 
not recognize or give effect to a legal status, 
right, or claim created by another jurisdiction 
respecting any other domestic union, however 
denominated. Nothing in this section shall 
impair any right or benefit extended by the 
State or its political subdivisions other than a 
right or benefit arising from a domestic union 
that is not valid or recognized in this State. 
This section shall not prohibit or limit parties, 
other than the State or its political 
subdivisions, from entering into contracts or 





Only marriage between a man and a woman 
shall be valid or recognized in South Dakota. 
The uniting of two or more persons in a civil 
union, domestic partnership, or other quasi-
marital relationship shall not be valid or 
recognized in South Dakota. 
Texas Article I, 
Section 32 
(a) Marriage in this state shall consist only of 
the union of one man and one woman. 
(b) This state or a political subdivision of this 
state may not create or recognize any legal 
status identical or similar to marriage. 
Utah Article I, 
Section 29 
(1) Marriage consists only of the legal union 
between a man and a woman. 
(2) No other domestic union, however 
denominated, may be recognized as a marriage 
or given the same or substantially equivalent 
legal effect. 
Virginia Article I, 
Section 15-A 
That only a union between one man and one 
woman may be a marriage valid in or 
recognized by this Commonwealth and its 
political subdivisions. 
This Commonwealth and its political 
subdivisions shall not create or recognize a 
legal status for relationships of unmarried 
individuals that intends to approximate the 
design, qualities, significance, or effects of 
marriage. Nor shall this Commonwealth or its 
political subdivisions create or recognize 
another union, partnership, or other legal 
status to which is assigned the rights, benefits, 
obligations, qualities, or effects of marriage. 
Wisconsin Article XIII, 
Section 13 
Only a marriage between one man and one 
woman shall be valid or recognized as a 
marriage in this state. A legal status identical 
or substantially similar to that of marriage for 
unmarried individuals shall not be valid or 
recognized in this state. 
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Alaska Article I,  
Section 25 
To be valid or recognized in this State, a 
marriage may exist only between one man 
and one woman. 
Arizona Article XXX, 
Section 1 
Only a union of one man and one woman 
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in 
this state. 
California Article I,  
Section 7.5 
Only marriage between a man and a woman 
is valid or recognized in California. 
Colorado Article II, 
Section 31 
Only a union of one man and one woman 
shall be valid or recognized as a marriage in 
this state. 
Mississippi Article XIV, 
Section 263A 
Marriage may take place and may be valid 
under the laws of this State only between a 
man and a woman. A marriage in another 
state or foreign jurisdiction between persons 
of the same gender, regardless of when the 
marriage took place, may not be recognized 
in this State and is void and unenforceable 
under the laws of this State. 
Missouri Article I,  
Section 33 
That to be valid and recognized in this state, 
a marriage shall exist only between a man 
and a woman. 
Montana Article XIII, 
Section 7 
Only a marriage between one man and one 
woman shall be valid or recognized as a 
marriage in this state. 
Nevada Article I,  
Section 21 
Only a marriage between a male and female 
person shall be recognized and given effect 
in this state. 
Oregon Article XV, 
Section 5a 
It is the policy of Oregon, and its political 
subdivisions, that only a marriage between 
one man and one woman shall be valid or 
legally recognized as a marriage. 
Tennessee Article XI, 
Section 18 
The historical institution and legal contract 
solemnizing the relationship of one (1) man 
and one (1) woman shall be the only legally 
recognized marital contract in this state. Any 
policy or law or judicial interpretation, 
purporting to define marriage as anything 
other than the historical institution and legal 
contract between one (1) man and one (1) 
woman, is contrary to the public policy of 
this state and shall be void and 
unenforceable in Tennessee. If another state 
or foreign jurisdiction issues a license for 
persons to marry and if such marriage is 
prohibited in this state by the provisions of 
this section, then the marriage shall be void 
and unenforceable in this state. 
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Hawaii Article 1,  
Section 23 
The legislature shall have the power to 
reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples. 
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APPENDIX B: 
RADIO & TELEVISION ADVERTISEMENT TRANSCRIPTS 
 
Transcript of “Common Sense” Television Ad: 
It’s just common sense. Ohio families are stronger with a wife 
AND a husband. Our children do better with a mother AND a father. 
We won’t have a future unless moms and dads have children. That’s 
why governments have recognized and uniquely protected marriage 
for more than 2,000 years. Why change that? Voting “Yes” on Issue 1 
KEEPS marriage between one man and one woman. That’s just 
common sense. Say “Yes” to marriage. Vote “Yes” on Issue 1. It’s 
just common sense. 
 
Transcript of “What You Know” Radio Ad: 
Ken Blackwell is a director of the National Taxpayers Union and 
has led efforts to repeal Ohio’s sales tax increase. This is Ohio 
Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mom and dad always taught 
me to “stick with what you know.” Voting “Yes” on Issue 1, the Ohio 
Marriage Amendment, does just that. Some people say Issue 1 will 
somehow hurt our state’s economy. But these same people set by 
quietly over the past ten years as Ohio government spending 
increased by more than 70%. And I didn’t hear a peep from them last 
summer while state government passed the largest tax increase in our 
state’s history. And now they want us to believe that marriage, the 
way we’ve always known it, will somehow hurt our economy. Here’s 
what I know. Bad politics hurts our economy, not marriage. Let’s 
stick with what we know to be right. I’m Ken Blackwell. For the 
future of Ohio, vote “Yes” on Issue 1, Ohio’s Marriage Amendment. 
 
Transcript of “BothWays” Radio Ad: 
This is Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mom and dad 
always taught me that you can’t have it both ways. Voting “Yes” on 
Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage Amendment, simply affirms that. Some 
folks have yet to learn that, especially politicians who say they’re 
opposed to same-sex marriage, but will not support Issue 1. Why? 
Because they want to have it both ways. Every major social science 
study tells us time and again: families are stronger with a wife and a 
husband; children do better with a mother and a father. That’s why 
marriage is the building block of society, and why government’s grant 
benefits based on that. We just can’t have it both ways. Marriage is 
between one man and one woman. And we should only give the 
benefits of marriage to those who are actually married. So vote “Yes” 
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on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage Amendment. Let’s go with what we 
know is right. I’m Ken Blackwell. For the future of Ohio, vote “Yes” 
on Issue 1. 
 
Transcript of “CommonSense” Radio Ad: 
This is Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mother and 
father taught me many things. But one of the most important was to 
use common sense. Voting “Yes” on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment, is just common sense. Ohio families are stronger with a 
wife and a husband. Our children do better with a mother and a father. 
That’s just common sense. It’s clear that we don’t have a future 
unless moms and dads have children. That’s why marriage is between 
a man and a woman. Just as God created it. And why governments 
have recognized it for thousands of years. So protecting marriage is 
really just common sense. So on November the second vote “Yes” on 
Issue 1, and protect marriage between one man and one woman. 
Some call Issue 1 the “Marriage Protection Act.” I like to call it the 
“Common Sense Protection Act.” Either way it’s a great idea. I’m 
Ken Blackwell. For the future of Ohio, vote “Yes” on Issue 1. 
 
Transcript of “Respect” Radio Ad: 
This is Ohio Secretary of State Ken Blackwell. My mom and dad 
taught me a great deal about respect. How each individual is one of 
God’s unique creations. How they deserve respect, even when you 
may disagree with them. Voting “Yes” on Issue 1, the Ohio Marriage 
Amendment, does just that. Voting “Yes” on Issue 1 keeps marriage 
as God created it, between one man and one woman. Some 
homosexual activists say that doesn’t respect them. I disagree. The 
Bible teaches me to love my neighbor, regardless of their lifestyle. 
But it also teaches me to never compromise the truth. If you respect 
others you’ll always tell them the truth. Ken Blackwell has twice been 
awarded the State Department Superior Honor Award for his human 
rights work. Please join him in voting “Yes” on Issue 1. Voting “Yes” 
on Issue 1 shows respect for marriage. This is Ken Blackwell. For the 
future of Ohio, vote “Yes” on Issue 1.  
 
All of the radio and television transcripts can be found at: 
Ohio Campaign to Protect Marriage, Legal Issues & News, 
http://www.ohiomarriage.com/Legal_Issues_&_News.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2010) (on file with author). 
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APPENDIX C: 
PRIVATE LIFE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT 
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APPENDIX D: 
PRIVATE LIFE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT TEXT 
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APPENDIX E: 
COMMON SENSE NEWSPAPER ADVERTISEMENT 
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APPENDIX F: 
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APPENDIX G: 
2004 OHIO ISSUE 1 REPORT 
